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ABSTRACT
The proposed draft of Article 2B grants broad rights to enforce elec-
tronically contract provisions governing access to and use of digital
works. Purveyors of digital works may engage in electronic self-help
following breach of contract, and may also elect to foreclose unauthor-
ized uses ex ante, via electronic “regulation of performance.” This Arti-
cle examines these provisions in light of existing law authorizing self-
help repossession of tangible chattels, leading academic justifications for
self-help repossession, and federal copyright law and policy. It concludes
that the provisions authorize an unprecedented degree of intrusion into
private homes and offices, that they lack a sound theoretical basis, and
that their adoption would threaten constitutionally-mandated limits on
copyright protection. It concludes, further, that the law should afford us-
ers of digital works rights of electronic self-help where necessary to pre-
serve the copyright balance.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
A new wind is blowing in copyright law. For centuries, authors and
their assignees have relied primarily on federal copyright law to define
and protect their legal rights. Suddenly, that may be about to change. New
developments in digital technology offer copyright owners the tantalizing
possibility of near-absolute control of their creative and informational
content, even after its delivery to end users, via self-enforcing digital con-
tracts. Copyright owners, along with purveyors of other (noncopy-
rightable) informational content, envision using these contracts to se-
cure—and redefine—their “informational rights.”1 Within this vision of
private ordering and technological self-help, contract law rather than copy-
right law is paramount. Limits on information ownership set by the public
law of copyright are conceived as optional restrictions that can be avoided
using appropriate contractual language.
Proposed Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) is de-
signed to play a central role in the restructuring of information law along
contract-based lines. Information providers hope that Article 2B will es-
tablish, as background principles of commercial law, rules that will enable
them to implement their vision of self-enforcing private ordering.2 The
drafters of Article 2B characterize these rules as broadly consistent with
                                                                                                                        
1. See U.C.C. § 2B-102(a)(27) (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft). As defined in Article 2B, “in-
formational rights” encompass “all rights in information created under laws governing
patents, copyrights, mask works, trade secrets, trademarks, publicity rights, or any other
law that permits a person, independently of contract, to control or preclude another per-
son’s use of the information on the basis of the rights holder’s interest in the informa-
tion.” Id.
Unless otherwise noted, all citations to ‘Article 2B’ or ‘proposed Article 2B’ in this
article refer to the July 24-31, 1998 Proposed Draft. Current and previous drafts of pro-
posed Article 2B, together with other official documents from the drafting process, are
available online via the National Council of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws’
Web page collection of draft uniform laws, maintained by the Biddle Law Library at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School. See National Council of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws, Drafts of Uniform and Model Acts, (last modified Oct. 21, 1998)
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ulc.htm#ucc2b>. Correspondence and other
documents submitted by interested parties during the drafting process are also available
on the Web. See Carol A. Kunze, The 2B Guide (last modified Nov. 1, 1998)
<http://www.2BGuide.com/>.
2. See U.C.C. § 2B-208 (July 24-31, 1998 Draft) (validating mass market standard-
form license terms); id. § 2B-310 (authorizing licensors to implement electronic regulation
of performance); id. § 2B-715 (authorizing licensor self-help following cancellation of a
covered agreement).
3the existing framework of commercial law.3 They suggest, further, that the
private agreements reached under such a regime can coexist with federal
copyright law without disrupting the balance it seeks to establish.4 Infor-
mation providers agree, and argue that, in any case, such agreements lie
beyond copyright’s preemptive reach.5 This article examines those asser-
tions. It concludes that the provisions of Article 2B threaten a substantial
departure from the existing law of self-help, and that this departure cannot
be justified by reference either to doctrine or to theory.6 Moreover, copy-
right law and policy point the other way, toward affording self-help rights
to users of copyrighted works.
Part II of this article describes the emerging digital “rights manage-
ment” technologies and traces the history of the provisions of Article 2B
that are designed to authorize or facilitate their implementation. Although
the most recent draft of Article 2B appears to moderate one of these provi-
sions, issues that earlier drafts had resolved in favor of electronic private
ordering will now confront courts. Parts III and IV explore, respectively,
the doctrinal foundations of self-help under the U.C.C. and more theoreti-
                                                                                                                        
3. See id. §§ 2B-208, Reporter’s Notes 3-4, 2B-310, Reporter’s Note 1, 2B-715, Re-
porter’s Note 3; see also U.C.C. Article 2B, Preface at 9 (July 24-31, 1998 Draft) (“Article
2B does not create contract law here—it merely provides a more coherent base for con-
tracting.”); Raymond T. Nimmer, The Relation Between Contract and Intellectual Property
Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 827, 829 (1998).
4. See U.C.C. § 2B-105, Reporter’s Notes 2-3; see also id. § 2B-105, Reporter’s
Notes 7-8; Nimmer, supra note 3, at 844. For a different characterization of Article 2B’s
approach to the relationship between contract and copyright, see David F. McGowan, Free
Contracting, Fair Competition, and Article 2B: Some Reflections on Federal Competition
Policy, Information Transactions, and “Aggressive Neutrality,” 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1173 (1998).
5. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996); Brief of
Amicus Curiae Software Publishers Association in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant, ProCD,
Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (No. 96-1139); Information Indus. Ass’n,
Comments of the Information Industry Association on Article 2B and Prof. Charles
McManis’ Proposed Amendment to Section 2B-308 (July 18, 1997)
<http://www.infoindustry.org/ppgrc/doclib/grdoc010.htm>; Copyright Comm., Ass’n of
Am. Publishers, Contractual Licensing, Technological Measures and Copyright Law (vis-
ited Nov. 11, 1998) <http://www.publishers.org/home/abouta/copy/licensing.htm>; see also
Robert W. Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A Brief Defense of Mass Market Soft-
ware License Agreements, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 335 (1996); Holly K.
Towle, Electronic Transactions and Contracting, in SECOND ANNUAL INTERNET LAW
INSTITUTE 515 (PLI, 1998).
6. Currently, self-help repossession is authorized in certain circumstances by U.C.C.
Articles 2A and 9, which govern leases and secured transactions respectively. See U.C.C.
§ 2A-525 (1990), U.C.C. § 9-503 (1972). The standards that govern self-help repossession
under Articles 2A and 9 are derived from the pre-U.C.C. common law. See infra text ac-
companying notes 45-54.
4cal models advanced by legal scholars, and conclude that none of the
common justifications for commercial private ordering supports according
information providers the broad powers of self-help that they claim as a
matter of right. To the contrary, Article 2B’s self-help provisions raise im-
portant problems that the drafters have failed to address. In Parts V and
VI, I evaluate the proposed law and emerging practice of electronic self-
help against the backdrop of copyright law and policy. Part V examines
the role of the public-private distinction in mediating between copyright
and contract, and argues that Article 2B is not merely a neutral back-
ground for private bilateral agreements, but a public act of social ordering
that is flatly inconsistent with copyright and First Amendment principles.
Part VI argues that licensees, not licensors, should be accorded rights of
electronic self-help when necessary to preserve the balance that the Copy-
right Act is intended to establish.
II. ELECTRONIC FENCING AND SELF-HELP UNDER
ARTICLE 2B
For information providers, digital networks represent both a promise
and a threat. Computer networks eliminate or minimize many of the costs
associated with product distribution, and make it possible for small busi-
nesses to serve national or even global markets. However, digitized infor-
mation is easily copied, and networks also minimize the costs of distrib-
uting unauthorized copies. Information providers have expressed fears that
by making their products available in digital form, they may destroy their
own markets. Scholars and industry commentators dispute these predic-
tions of total disaster, and argue that the economic principles that deter-
mine profitability in markets in tangible commodities do not necessarily
apply to markets in intangibles.7 Nonetheless, information providers have
stated a reluctance to experiment with digital distribution without addi-
tional legal and technological protection against unauthorized copying.8
                                                                                                                        
7. See, e.g., John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: A Framework for Rethinking
Patents and Copyrights in the Digital Age, WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 85; JAMES BOYLE,
SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY 35-41 (1995); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Ortho-
doxy of “Rights Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 301, 381-90 (1998); J. Bradford DeLong
& A. Michael Froomkin, The Next Economy?, in INTERNET PUBLISHING AND BEYOND: THE
ECONOMICS OF DIGITAL INFORMATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Deborah Hurley et
al. eds., forthcoming 1998); Esther Dyson, Intellectual Value, WIRED, July 1995, at 136.
8. See, e.g., WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act: Hearing on H.R. 2281
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications Trade & Consumer Protection of the House
Comm. on Com., 105th Cong. (1998) [hereinafter H.R. 2281 Commerce Hearing] (state-
5Happily for information providers, digital technologies also offer a
solution to their perceived problem. The same technologies that can be
used to propagate information can also build fences around it. Together
with technology experts, information providers are developing secure
packaging and delivery software designed to prevent purchasers and third
parties from making unauthorized uses of digital content.9 As envisioned
by the copyright and information industries, these “rights management
systems” will be “capable of detecting, preventing, and counting” almost
                                                                                                                        
ment of Robert W. Holleyman, II, President, The Business Software Alliance); Copyright
Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 2281 Before the Subcomm. on Cts. and Intell. Prop. of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter H.R. 2281 Judiciary
Hearings] (statements of Robert W. Holleyman, II, President, The Business Software Alli-
ance; Allee Willis, on behalf of Broadcast Music, Inc.; Tom Ryan, CEO, SciTech Software,
Inc., on behalf of the Software Publishers’ Ass’n; Gail Markels, General Counsel and Sen-
ior Vice President, Interactive Digital Software Ass’n; and Allen R. Adler, Vice President
for Legal and Governmental Affairs, Association of Am. Publishers); National Information
Infrastructure: Hearing on S. 1284 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.
(1996) [hereinafter S. 1284 Hearing] (testimony of Kenneth R. Kay, Executive Director,
Creative Incentive Coalition); Copyright Protection on the Internet: Hearings on H.R. 2441
Before the Subcomm. on Cts. and Intell. Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong. (1996) [hereinafter H.R. 2441 Hearing] (statements of Barbara A. Munder, Senior
Vice President, The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.; Frances W. Preston, President and
CEO, Broadcast Music, Inc.; Jack Valenti, Chairman and CEO, Motion Picture Ass’n of
Am., Inc.; and the Association of Am. Publishers); see also WORKING GROUP ON IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 10-12 (1995) [hereinafter NII WHITE PAPER].
9. See Jon Bing, The Contribution of Technology to the Identification of Rights, Es-
pecially in Sound and Audio-Visual Works: An Overview, 4 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 234
(1996); CHRISTOPHER BURNS, INC., COPYRIGHT MANAGEMENT AND THE NII: REPORT TO
THE ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES COMMITTEE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN PUB-
LISHERS (1996); Charles Clark, The Publisher in the Digital World, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE KNOWRIGHT ‘95
CONFERENCE 85 (Klaus Brunnstein & Peter Paul Sint eds., 1995; Daniel J. Gervais, Elec-
tronic Rights Management Systems (ERMS): The Next Logical Step in the Evolution of
Rights Management (visited Nov. 13, 1998) <http://www.copyright.com/>; Daniel J. Ger-
vais, Electronic Copyright Management Systems (ECMS): From Rights Trading to Elec-
tronic Publishing (visited Nov. 13, 1998) <http://www.copyright.com/>; Mark Stefik,
Shifting the Possible: How Digital Property Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Pub-
lishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 138 (1997); MARK STEFIK, Letting Loose the Light: Ig-
niting Commerce in Electronic Publication, in INTERNET DREAMS: ARCHETYPES, MYTHS,
AND METAPHORS 219 (1996); PETER WAYNER, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION (1997);
Robert Weber, Digital Rights Management Technologies, <http://www.ncri.com/articles/-
rights_management/ifrro95.html>. See generally Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anony-
mously: A Closer Look at “Copyright Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV.
981, 983-87 (1996) (describing capabilities of digital rights management systems).
6every conceivable use of a digital work.10 In addition, these industries lob-
bied heavily for nearly three years for legislation that would prohibit tam-
pering with or circumventing these systems.11
Unhappily for consumers, however, digital rights management regimes
will enable information providers to appropriate far more protection
against copying and distribution than intellectual property law now pro-
vides. Copyright law allows some reuse of protected expression under a
variety of exceptions designed to serve the public interest, and allows any
reuse after the term of copyright protection has expired.12 Copyright also
does not attach to facts, ideas, or functional principles; instead, it treats
these materials as public domain “building blocks” for future works.13
Many compilations of information consist largely of such public domain
material and are protected only minimally, if at all, by copyright.14 The
common law tort of data misappropriation provides some protection for
uncopyrightable facts, but cannot protect against all copying, since the
Copyright Act expressly preempts state-created rights that are “equiva-
lent” to the rights afforded under copyright law.15 Trade secrecy law pro-
                                                                                                                        
10. See Weber, supra note 9, § 3.1.1; see also CHRISTOPHER BURNS, INC., supra note
9, at 17-21, 31-35; Stefik, Shifting the Possible, supra note 9, at 140-44; STEFIK, Letting
Loose the Light, supra note 9, at 228-38.
11. For information provider testimony in support of legislation, see H.R. 2281 Com-
merce Hearing, supra note 8; H.R. 2281 Judiciary Hearings, supra note 8; S. 1284 Hear-
ing, supra note 8; H.R. 2441 Hearing, supra note 8; see also NII WHITE PAPER, supra note
8. Legislation designed to protect digital rights management systems was enacted this year.
See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). For
discussion of its provisions, see infra note 201.
12. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 107 (1994) (fair use doctrine, which allows, inter alia, re-
use of protected expression for purposes of criticism, classroom or research use, and par-
ody), 108 (1994) (library copying privileges), 109(a) (1994) (limitation of exclusive distri-
bution right to first sale of copy for most works), 110 (1994) (public performance and dis-
play exemptions for nonprofit activities and organizations), 302 (1994) (duration of copy-
right protection).
13. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 993
(1990).
14. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-50. Even for those compilations that incorporate origi-
nal expression in the selection or arrangement of the underlying data, copyright protection
extends only to those aspects and not to the data itself. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1994). See gen-
erally 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.04[B][2]
(46th rel. 1998).
15. See infra Part V.A. Compare International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248
U.S. 215 (1918) (recognizing a common law cause of action for misappropriation of un-
copyrightable news content), with 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994) (preempting “equivalent”
state-created rights in subject matter of copyright). On the appropriate role of data misap-
propriation law within the interstices of federal copyright law, see National Basketball
7tects only information that is not generally known or readily ascertainable,
and allows discovery of protected information by reverse engineering and
other “proper means.”16 In short, legal protection against unauthorized
copying and distribution is incomplete, and is so by design.
Information providers conceive digital rights management systems as
self-enforcing contracts, and argue that copyright law does not displace
private bargains that alter the distribution of rights and privileges as be-
tween the parties.17 However, courts have differed on the validity, as a
                                                                                                                        
Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 852-54 (2d Cir. 1997); see also United States Golf
Ass’n v. St. Andrews Sys., 749 F.2d 1028, 1037-38 (3d Cir. 1984) (articulating a narrow
basis for the misappropriation tort).
There may soon exist federal protection for uncopyrightable databases and their con-
tents. Database protection bills were introduced in both houses of Congress in 1998. See
Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. (1997); Collections of
Information Antipiracy Act, S. 2291, 105th Cong. (1998). The House bill was incorporated
into the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, which passed the House on July 29, 1998. See
Digital Millenium Copyright Act, H.R. 2281, 105th Cong., Title V. However, the Senate-
approved version of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act did not include database protec-
tion. See Digital Millenium Copyright Act, S. 2037, 105th Cong. Because the Senate has
yet to hold hearings on database protection, the database provisions were removed from the
final version of the bill. See Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112
Stat. 2860 (1998). Whether and to what extent such protection would be inconsistent with
the constitutional origins of and limits to federal copyright protection are unresolved ques-
tions. Cf. infra Part V.A (discussing constitutional preemption of state laws that confer
property-like protection on uncopyrightable material).
16. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (1985); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION §§ 39, 43 (1995); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141, 157 (1989); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
17. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996); Brief of
Amicus Curiae Software Publishers Association in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant, ProCD,
Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (No. 96-1139); Information Indus. Ass’n,
supra note 5; Copyright Comm., Ass’n of Am. Publishers, supra note 5; see also Tom W.
Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright’s
Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 609-11 (1998). Many other commentators dis-
agree, and argue that copyright does and should displace at least some types of contract
restrictions. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 7, at 322-28; Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections on
Copyright Management Systems and Laws Designed to Protect Them, 12 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 161, 181-82 (1997); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of
Contract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 107-10 (1997); Dennis S. Karjala, Federal Preemp-
tion of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 512, 525-33 (1997);
Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 1, (1995); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Federal Law and Policy of
Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 111 (forthcoming 1999); Mark A.
Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1995); 1
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 14, § 3.04[B][3]; David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private
Contract, and Public Policy: Federal Preemption of Software License Provisions Against
Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 543 (1992); see also infra Part V.
8matter of contract law, of “shrinkwrap” licenses that purport to restrict the
uses of information products based on terms packaged with the product
and revealed to the customer after purchase.18 Accordingly, many infor-
mation providers have supported efforts to draft a new Article 2B of the
Uniform Commercial Code to establish different ground rules for transac-
tions in software, information, and other intangible intellectual products.19
Among other things, proposed Article 2B is intended to validate self-
enforcing shrinkwrap (or “clickwrap”) licenses—including mass market
standard forms—implemented via digital rights management regimes.20
Proposed Article 2B implements this regime of electronic private or-
dering primarily through two provisions. Section 2B-310, which applies to
performance of the contract, allows “electronic regulation of performance”
by either party in specified circumstances.21 First, section 2B-310 permits
                                                                                                                        
18. Compare, e.g., ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451-53 (holding shrinkwrap license valid and
enforceable because consumer could have returned the product before using it if he did not
wish to accept the terms), with, e.g., Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91
(3d Cir. 1991) (holding that shrinkwrap license terms disclosed after product had been ex-
changed for payment did not become part of the bargain between the parties). It is worth
noting that despite the enormous amount of attention and discussion devoted to the ProCD
decision, far more courts have held later-disclosed license terms unenforceable. See Lem-
ley, Beyond Preemption, supra note 17, at 120, n.20 (collecting cases).
19. See, e.g., Business Software Alliance, Software Publishers Ass’n & Info. Indus.
Ass’n, Article 2B (July 15, 1998) <http://www.2BGuide.com/docs/amemo981.html>; In-
formation Indus. Ass’n, supra note 5; Business Software Alliance, Information Indus.
Ass’n & Silicon Valley Software Indus. Coalition, Article 2B (July 14, 1998)
<http://www.2BGuide.com/docs/amtng98.html>; see also Business Software Alliance,
Policy Issues: Response to Comments on Draft of UCC Article 2B by Consumers Union
(July 17, 1997) <http://www.2BGuide.com/docs/bsacun.html >; Software Publishers Ass’n,
Article 2B, Uniform Commercial Code: Exploding the Myth that the Draft is Unbalanced
(July 15, 1997) <http://www.2BGuide.com/docs/span.html >. See generally Cem Kaner,
Restricting Competition in the Software Industry: Impact of the Pending Revisions to the
Uniform Commercial Code (last modified Nov. 11, 1998) <http://www.badsoftware.com/-
nader.htm> (describing information provider involvement in Article 2B drafting process).
Although the more “traditional” copyright industries have supported digital rights manage-
ment vociferously in other contexts, see supra notes 8, 11, they have not all been as enthu-
siastic about Article 2B as a whole. See, e.g., Letter from Simon Barsky, Senior Vice Presi-
dent and General Counsel, Motion Picture Ass’n, to Carlyle Ring, Jr., Chair, Article 2B
Drafting Committee (Apr. 29, 1998) <http://www.2BGuide.com/docs/conn0429.html> (ex-
pressing reservations about Article 2B and suggesting that the scope of the project be nar-
rowed to include only computer software and electronic information products). But see As-
sociation of Am. Publishers, supra note 5 (expressing support for the Article 2B project).
20. See U.C.C. §§ 2B-208, 2B-310 (July 24-31, 1998 Draft). On the significance of
the “license” characterization, see David A. Rice, Digital Information as Property and
Product: U.C.C. Article 2B, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 621, 624-26, 632-34 (1997).
21. Section 2B-310 provides:
Section 2B-310. Electronic Regulation of Performance.
9electronic regulation if expressly authorized by a term in the license
agreement.22 However, section 2B-310 goes on to create a list of excep-
tions that virtually swallows this express disclosure rule. The license need
not disclose electronic regulation that merely implements a stated tempo-
ral or quantitative restriction on use, or enforces “informational rights
which were not granted to the licensee.”23 Nor must it disclose electronic
regulation that “prevents uses of the information which are inconsistent
                                                                                                                        
(a) In this section, “restraint” means a program, code, device, or
similar electronic or physical limitation that restricts the use of infor-
mation.
(b) A party entitled to enforce a limitation on use of information
which does not depend on a breach of contract by the other party may
include a restraint in the information or a copy of the information and
use that restraint if:
(1) a term of the agreement authorizes use of the restraint;
(2) the restraint prevents uses of the information which are in-
consistent with the agreement or with informational rights which were
not granted to the licensee;
(3) the restraint prevents uses of the information after expira-
tion of the stated duration of the contract or a stated number of uses; or
(4) the restraint prevents use when the contract terminates,
other than on expiration of a stated duration or number of uses, and the
licensor gives reasonable notice to the licensee before further use is
prevented.
(c) Unless authorized by a term of the agreement, this section does
not permit a restraint that affirmatively prevents or makes impractica-
ble a licensee’s access to its own information in the licensee’s posses-
sion by means other than by use of the licensor’s information or infor-
mational rights.
(d) A party that includes or uses a restraint pursuant to subsection
(b) or (c) is not liable for any loss caused by its authorized use of the
restraint.
(e) This section does not preclude electronic replacement or dis-
abling of an earlier copy of information by the licensor in connection
with delivery of a new copy or version under an agreement to elec-
tronically replace or disable the earlier copy with an upgrade or other
new information.
U.C.C. § 2B-310 (July 24-31, 1998 Draft).
22. Id. § 2B-310(b)(1). On its face, this provision is unremarkable. However, when
read in conjunction with section 2B-208, which validates standard-form terms that consum-
ers have had the opportunity to review (whether or not they actually did so), it raises trou-
bling questions. Whether mass market licensees should be deemed to have consented to
provisions for automatic, self-enforcing electronic regulation is discussed infra Part IV.
23. U.C.C. § 2B-310(b)(2)-(3) & Reporter’s Note 5 (July 24-31, 1998 Draft).
10
with the agreement”—apparently, even if copyright law or other applica-
ble “informational rights” law would allow such uses.24
Effectively, section 2B-310 would allow information providers to
contract around copyright law without disclosing that fact to users. The
Reporter’s Notes to section 2B-310 make only oblique mention of copy-
right preemption. They assert that the provision simply represents “[t]he
basic principle … that a contract can be enforced.”25 Proposed Article 2B
does contain another provision, section 2B-105, that acknowledges the
possibility of copyright preemption of particular contract terms; in the ac-
companying Reporter’s Notes, the drafters disclaim jurisdiction to make
specific recommendations about preemption.26 Nonetheless, both the Re-
porter’s Notes and the prefatory memorandum accompanying Article 2B
make clear their belief that even mass market contracts that are inconsis-
tent with copyright are not necessarily invalid for that reason.27 The draft-
ers describe Article 2B’s approach to the question of federal preemption as
one of “neutrality”; under this vision, it appears, contract may extend
wherever it is not expressly prohibited by Congress or the federal courts.28
Section 2B-715, which applies in the event of a breach by the licensee
justifying cancellation of the agreement, governs “self-help repossession”
by the licensor.29 Unlike section 2B-310, which has no analogue in the
                                                                                                                        
24. Id. § 2B-310(b)(2).
25. Id. § 2B-310, Reporter’s Note 2.
26. Id. § 2B-105(a) (“A provision of this article which is preempted by federal law is
unenforceable to the extent of that provision.”); Id. § 2B-105, Reporter’s Note 1 (“When or
whether federal law controls is not an issue of state law. State law, including the U.C.C.,
cannot alter federal policy and the balance it may entail. Article 2B does not intend to do
so.”).
27. Id. at 10-12; id. § 2B-105, Reporter’s Notes 3-4. It is difficult to imagine that the
drafters would have included detailed provisions authorizing electronic private ordering if
they believed that such agreements would be preempted. See also Nimmer, supra note 3, at
845-51.
28. See U.C.C. § 2B-105, Reporter’s Note 3 (July 24-31, 1998 Draft); McGowan, su-
pra note 4, at 1195-1214 (explicating the drafters’ vision of “neutrality”); David Nimmer et
al., The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 17, 41-42 (forthcoming
1999) (analyzing Article 2B’s “neutrality myth”).
29. Section 2B-715 provides:
Section 2B-715. Right to Possession and to Prevent Use.
(a) Upon cancellation of a license, the licensor has the right:
(1) to possession of all copies of the licensed information in
the possession or control of the licensee and any other materials per-
taining to that information which by contract were to be returned or
delivered by the licensee to the licensor; and
(2) to prevent the continued exercise of contractual and infor-
mational rights in the licensed information.
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current U.C.C., section 2B-715 is expressly modeled after section 2A-525,
which authorizes self-help repossession of leased property by the lessor,
and section 9-503, which authorizes self-help repossession of secured
collateral by the holder of the security interest.30 Like sections 2A-525 and
9-503, section 2B-715 allows self-help repossession following cancella-
tion if possible “without a breach of the peace.”31 Cancellation, in turn,
requires a material breach or express contractual authorization.32 In addi-
tion, section 2B-715 adds the express requirement that the repossession
not create “a foreseeable risk of personal injury or significant damage to
information or property other than the licensed information.”33
The most recent draft of Article 2B is silent on the question of elec-
tronic self-help repossession—or, more precisely, since nothing physical
                                                                                                                        
(b) Except as otherwise provided in Section 2B-714, a licensor
may exercise its rights under subsection (a) without judicial process
only if this can be done:
(1) without a breach of the peace; and
(2) without a foreseeable risk of personal injury or significant
damage to information or property other than the licensed information.
(c) In a judicial proceeding, a court may enjoin a licensee in breach
of contract from continued use of the information and the informa-
tional rights and may order that the licensor or an officer of the court
take the steps described in Section 2B-627.
(d) A party has the right to an expedited judicial hearing on pre-
judgment relief to enforce or protect its rights under this section.
(e) The right to possession under this section is not available to the
extent that the information, before breach of the license and in the or-
dinary course of performance under the license, was so altered or
commingled that the information is no longer identifiable or separable.
(f) A licensee that provides information to a licensor subject to
contractual use restrictions has the rights and is subject to the limita-
tions of a licensor under this section with respect to the information it
provides.
U.C.C. § 2B-715 (July 24-31, 1998 Draft). Section 2B-714 permits an access contract
provider to discontinue access in the event of a material breach. Id. § 2B-714.
30. U.C.C. § 2A-525 (1990); U.C.C. § 9-503 (1972). For discussion of the legal stan-
dards governing self-help repossession, as developed in the contexts of Articles 2A and 9,
see infra Part III.A-B.
31. U.C.C. § 2B-715(b)(1) (July 24-31, 1998 Draft).
32. See id. § 2B-702(a).
33. Id. § 2B-715(b)(2). Because the “breach of the peace” standard has been applied
to prohibit injury to persons or property, the Reporter’s Notes to previous drafts correctly
characterized these additional restrictions as a mere “clarifying step.” See, e.g., U.C.C. §
2B-716, Reporter’s Note 1 (Apr. 15, 1998 Draft). The most recent version of the Reporter’s
Notes represents, instead, that this language places “more restrictions” on self-help than
under sections 2A-525 and 9-503. U.C.C. § 2B-715, Reporter’s Note 3 (July 24-31, 1998
Draft).
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need be reclaimed, electronic self-help deactivation or depossession—of
licensed information products. This was not always so. In previous drafts,
Article 2B contained a special provision expressly authorizing electronic
self-help repossession.34 Section 2B-716 (now omitted) established addi-
tional procedural requirements for electronic self-help in cases involving
licensed software “material to the licensee’s business.”35 Such material
could be repossessed or “depossessed” electronically only if the licensor
first gained physical possession of a copy (subject to the “breach of the
peace” limitation) or if the license authorized the repossession and the li-
censor gave at least ten business days’ notice.36 By implication, licensed
information consisting of “informational content,” or used for personal
rather than business purposes, was subject to electronic repossession with-
out physical possession and without notice of any kind, as long as no
“breach of the peace” occurred.37
During its short life, proposed section 2B-716 was enormously contro-
versial. The drafting committee itself was deeply divided on the question
of electronic self-help, so much so that for a time section 2B-716 existed
in two versions, a majority version allowing electronic self-help and a mi-
nority version prohibiting it except to the extent expressly authorized by
other law.38 The new section 2B-715 simply steers clear of the entire con-
troversy without resolving any of the issues that former section 2B-716
raised. The Reporter’s Notes state that the draft “takes no position on
whether self-help can be pursued through electronic means.”39 This abrupt
retrenchment leaves to the courts the task of interpreting the “breach of the
peace” and “material breach” limitations in the context of digitally-
mediated transactions in creative and informational works.
Together with other provisions of Article 2B that validate mass market
“licenses,”40 sections 2B-310 and 2B-715 would give information provid-
                                                                                                                        
34. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2B-716 (Apr. 1, 1998 Draft).
35. Id. § 2B-716(a).
36. Id.
37. Id. §§ 2B-715(b), 2B-716(a). On the question whether the “breach of the peace”
standard that limits physical repossession is an appropriate measure of the harms threatened
by electronic regulation and repossession, see infra Part III.
38. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2B-716 (Feb. 1998 Draft).
39. U.C.C. § 2B-715, Reporter’s Note 3 (Aug. 1, 1998 Draft).
40. See id. § 2B-208. Under section 2B-208, the terms of a mass market license are
valid and enforceable if the license manifests assent to the license prior to use of the li-
censed information, whether or not the licensee actually reviewed the license terms. Id. §
2B-208(a). If the first opportunity to review the terms occurs after payment and the licensee
does not wish to manifest assent, the licensee is entitled to rescission and a refund. Id. § 2B-
208(b).
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ers enormous power to alter the balance of creator rights and user privi-
leges established by the Copyright Act.41 This is true even though section
2B-715 now leaves unanswered the question of electronic self-help fol-
lowing cancellation. As Professor Friedman correctly recognizes, the most
effective electronic self-help is the kind covered by section 2B-310—so-
called “electronic regulation of performance” that simply forecloses po-
tential breach at the outset.42 As the technologies of electronic regulation
become more sophisticated, a separate right of electronic “repossession” is
of less moment. As I have noted, the drafters of Article 2B nonetheless
characterize sections 2B-310 and 2B-715 as entirely consistent with the
existing framework of commercial law, and indicate their belief that the
regimes of private ordering authorized by Article 2B would not violate
copyright law or other law or policy.43 The remainder of this article evalu-
ates those contentions.
III. DOCTRINE: SELF-HELP, TRESPASS, AND THE RIGHTS OF
PERSONS
Both the common law and the U.C.C. have traditionally afforded
rights of self-help to vendors and creditors. However, both bodies of law
limit the right to enter private property to repossess goods, allowing such
entry only when the circumstances indicate consent, or at least acquies-
cence. Judged against these limits, Article 2B sanctions a degree of intru-
sion into private homes and offices that is unprecedented. It also author-
izes self-help in a much broader range of circumstances, including those in
which licensee conduct, although defined as breach, is privileged by the
public law of copyright. To a far greater extent than existing law, Article
2B elevates the rights of mass market vendors over those of consumers
and rights in “informational property” over the rights of persons to secu-
                                                                                                                        
41. At the same time, the drafters have eliminated defenses that might have been
raised by licensees, such as section 2-403’s provision for the unenforceability of property
rights against a bona fide purchaser for value, on the ground that they are inconsistent with
licensors’ federal intellectual property rights. Id. at 15.
42. See David D. Friedman, In Defense of Private Orderings, 13 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1151, 1153-54 (1998). For example, the license for a work might allow only one user at
a time, and the software in which the work is encoded might enforce this restriction by pre-
venting a second user from opening the work if it detects that the work is already in use. As
long as the second user cannot defeat the restriction by tampering with the encoding soft-
ware—a possibility discussed further in Part VI—the circumstances that would constitute a
breach cannot occur.
43. See U.C.C. Article 2B, Preface at 10-12 (July 24-31, 1998 Draft); id. § 2B-105,
Reporter’s Notes 3-4; Nimmer, supra note 3, at 840-50, 858-70, 877-84.
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rity and autonomy within private spaces.44 Whether and to what extent this
approach is warranted depends on how “intrusion” is conceived and on the
purposes that self-help and the legal standards governing it are thought to
serve.
Before digital technologies made remote or prospective self-help pos-
sible, self-help repossession necessarily entailed physical recovery of dis-
puted goods following an alleged breach of contract. The law of self-help
thus has been, until now, the law of physical, ex post repossession of
chattels, which in turn has focused heavily on the likelihood of physical
violence. Courts considering these cases have not explained, because they
have not needed to, whether the judicially-developed “breach of the
peace” standard is only designed to minimize the likelihood of physical
violence and harm to persons and property, or is (or should be) more
broadly concerned with preventing nonconsensual intrusion—and if so,
what kinds of nonconsensual intrusion count. Because the universe of pos-
sible transgressions with respect to leased and secured chattels is relatively
narrow, they also have not explored whether in other circumstances the
law might or should impose substantive limits on the sorts of dereliction
that justify self-help behavior. Finally, they have not considered whether
standards developed to govern self-help following cancellation should ap-
ply to self-enforcing “regulation of performance” ex ante. Article 2B’s
proposed extension of self-help privileges to encompass electronic repos-
session and prospective self-help requires answers to all three sets of
questions.
A. Self-Help and Private Spaces
The physical self-help tactics employed at the dawn of the consumer
credit era created risks of physical violence and raised questions about
                                                                                                                        
44. As used in this essay, “consumers” includes both individuals and other entities
that purchase (or “license”) creative and informational works through the retail mass mar-
ket. Although Article 2B defines “consumers” to include individuals only, this broader
definition is consistent with Article 2B’s distinction between mass market and non-mass
market transactions:
In the retail mass market, and in many non-retail transactions, most
modern transactions are standardized. An information provider defines
the terms under which its information products are made available to
the retail marketplace and end users in that marketplace elect to either
acquire or not acquire [sic] the information on these terms. The trans-
actions are anonymous in that the information provider does not re-
strict those to whom the information is given except based on the li-
censee’s willingness to agree to terms and to pay the applicable license
fee.
U.C.C. § 2B-208, Reporter’s Note 2 (July 24-31, 1998 Draft).
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debtors’ rights to security against trespass and other intrusions. To mini-
mize these concerns, courts developed rules that allowed self-help repos-
session only if it could be accomplished without a breach of the peace.45
Although courts created exceptions to the law of trespass to accommodate
a perceived need for self-help repossession of chattels kept on private
property, they used the “breach of the peace” standard and the concept of
noncoerced consent to cabin these exceptions. Thus, creditors could enter
private property to recover chattels sitting in plain view in a yard or
driveway, if the debtor offered no resistance.46 They could not, however,
break into a debtor’s home or business premises, or use or threaten force
to gain entry if permission to enter was refused.47 Only the state could en-
ter a private home or office against the owner’s will, and then only within
the limits established by due process principles.48
The rules governing self-help repossession under Articles 9 and 2A of
the U.C.C., which expressly incorporate the “breach of the peace” stan-
dard, mirror those developed under the common law.49 Creditors may en-
                                                                                                                        
45. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 912-
13 (4th ed. 1995) (characterizing “breach of the peace” standard as based on whether the
creditor sought to enter peaceably or threatened force, and whether the debtor consented to
entry or opposed it).
46. See id. at 913 & n.5.
47. See id. at 913 & n.4.
48. See U.S. CONST. amends. IV, XIV; Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949)
(characterizing Fourth Amendment guarantee of privacy as “implicit in ‘the concept of or-
dered liberty’” established by Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, but holding that
exclusionary rule is not constitutionally-mandated as to states) (quoting Palko v. Connecti-
cut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-57 (1961)
(expanding due process-based guarantee to include exclusionary rule).
49. U.C.C. § 2A-525 (1990); U.C.C. § 9-503 (1972); see WHITE & SUMMERS, supra
note 45, at 912 (“The drafters knowingly chose this well-worn phrase, and did not define it
anew. Accordingly the numerous pre-Code cases are still good law.”); see also BARKLEY
CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ¶
4.05[2][b][i] (3d ed. 1993 & Supp. 1998). Compare, e.g., Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Koontz,
661 N.E.2d 1171, 1173-74 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (upholding repossession of car parked in
debtor’s front yard), and Wade v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 668 P.2d 183, 187 (Kan. Ct. App.
1983) (upholding repossession of car parked in debtor’s driveway), with Laurel Coal Co. v.
Walter E. Heller & Co., 539 F. Supp. 1006, 1007 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (holding repossession
unlawful where repossessors cut chain used to lock debtor’s premises), and Morris v. First
Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 254 N.E.2d 683, 686 (Ohio 1970) (holding repossession unlawful
where debtor’s son confronted repossessors and stopped protesting only when he was
physically surrounded).
Similar balancing principles exist in landlord-tenant law, another area in which both
parties may be said to have “property”-like interests in the subject matter of the dispute. Cf.
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 993 (1982) (deline-
ating a theory of property rights based on “personhood” interests and arguing that rental
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ter upon private property, but their ability to do so is severely restricted.
“‘The two primary factors considered in making th[e] determination are
the potential for immediate violence and the nature of the premises in-
truded upon.’”50 Although many contracts expressly authorize creditors to
enter private premises to effectuate repossession, courts have read the
breach of the peace limitation into these clauses, as well.51 In the eleven
states that have adopted the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (“U3C”) as a
modification to Article 9, moreover, the creditor may not enter a dwelling
“unless the consumer voluntarily surrenders possession of the collateral to
the creditor.”52 Courts in non-U3C jurisdictions have not specified what
                                                                                                                        
tenants should be recognized as having property interests in their homes); MARGARET JANE
RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 108-12 (1996) (incorporating housing-related interests
into a broader theory of “human flourishing”). Early English common and statutory law
accorded landlords broad rights to eject tenants and distrain their personal property to sat-
isfy unpaid rent obligations. See Special Project, Self-Help: Extrajudicial Rights, Privileges
and Remedies in Contemporary American Society, 37 VAND. L. REV. 845, 938-41, 946-49
(1984). However, later courts and legislators gradually restricted the permissible scope of
landlord self-help. See id. at 940-41, 947-49. Contemporary American landlord-tenant law
is increasingly hostile to self-help eviction of any kind. Many states prohibit self-help re-
possession outright, and most that allow it impose a strict “breach of the peace” standard.
See id. at 950-53; ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.80, at 403-
04 (2d ed. 1993). Instead, all states have created summary eviction procedures designed to
afford tenants notice and an opportunity to appear before a judge. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT §§ 14.1-.3 (1977); CUNNINGHAM ET AL.,
supra, § 6.79, at 400-01; see, e.g., Berg v. Wiley, 264 N.W.2d 145, 150-51 (Minn. 1978). In
addition, recognizing that tenants who fail to make rent payments may have justification,
most states allow tenants to raise defenses, such as the implied warranty of habitability, for
consideration by the court. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra, § 6.79, at 401.
50. Salisbury Livestock Co. v. Colorado Cent. Credit Union, 793 P.2d 470, 474
(Wyo. 1990) (quoting Cottam v. Heppner, 777 P.2d 468, 472 (Utah 1989)); cf. Stone Mach.
Co. v. Kessler, 463 P.2d 651, 654 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970) (“To constitute a ‘breach of the
peace’ it is not necessary that the peace be actually broken … nor is actual personal vio-
lence an essential element of the offense.”). See generally Jean Braucher, The Repo Code: A
Study of Adjustment to Uncertainty in Commercial Law, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 549, 572-91
(1997) (summarizing case law on self-help repossession); CLARK, supra note 49, ¶
4.05[2][b][i] (same).
51. See CLARK, supra note 49, ¶ 4.05[2][b][i], at 4-82 (“A security agreement that
purports to waive breach of the peace in advance is not worth the paper it is written on.”).
As Clark explains, courts have implied this limitation even though Article 9 does not forbid
waiver of the right against breach of the peace. See id. Arguably, this restricts the parties’
freedom to contract for terms of their own choosing. For discussion of the theoretical and
practical difficulty of applying notions of “consent” to mass market, standard-form contract
terms, see infra Part IV.
52. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE art. 5, § 5-112 & cmt. 1 (1974) (“It is necessary
… to make it clear that dwellings cannot be entered absent the consent of the occupants
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constitutes permissible entry, and why, in situations not involving overt
force or threats of force.53 Generally speaking, courts in non-trespassory
repossession cases have allowed some forms of deceit and trickery and
prohibited others, and have justified both kinds of results by reference to
the relationship between force, consent, and the likelihood of harm.54
How should the ancient “breach of the peace” standard and its associ-
ated concern with protecting private spaces be understood in connection
with virtual, nonrepossessory self-help? Is the touchstone nonconsensual
intrusion, or is the objection to nonconsensual intrusion simply that it
threatens violence? Plainly, the nonviolent nature of electronic self-help—
not to mention electronic “regulation” of performance—does not negate
its invasiveness from the consumer’s perspective. The widespread outrage
that greeted rumors of a “registration wizard” in Microsoft’s Windows
software, which purportedly reported back to Microsoft via the Internet on
                                                                                                                        
except under the supervision of the court.”); see AM. JUR. 2D Desk Book Item No. 282
(1992) (summarizing adoption of uniform laws by jurisdiction).
The U3C is not an isolated instance of pro-consumer liberalization. In particular, a
number of states have exempted, completely or partially, consumer sales from Article 2’s
provisions allowing disclaimers of warranty. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-2-
316 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-316(a) (West 1990);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325.954 (West 1966 & Supp. 1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A-
2-316 (West 1995); see also Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2310
(1994) (establishing federal minimum standards for warranty protection of tangible con-
sumer products).
53. In a U3C jurisdiction, this question would exist as to private property other than
dwellings.
54. Compare, e.g., K.B. Oil Co. v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 811 F.2d 310, 315 (6th Cir.
1987) (upholding repossession of truck being serviced by used truck dealer after misrepre-
senting to dealer that debtor had consented), Thompson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 550 F.2d
256, 258 (5th Cir. 1977) (upholding repossession from garage after misrepresenting to ga-
rage employees that debtor had consented), and Cox v. Galigher Motor Sales Co., 213
S.E.2d 475, 479 (W. Va. 1975) (upholding repossession made after telling the debtor that
truck was being taken to have repairs performed), with, e.g., Chrysler Credit Corp. v.
McKinney, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 1409 (Ala. 1984) (invalidating repossession made
after luring debtor to leave car with dealership for repairs), rev’d on reh’g and remanded on
other grounds, 456 So. 2d 1069 (Ala. 1984) and Ford Motor Credit Corp. v. Byrd, 351 So.
2d 557 (Ala. 1977) (invalidating repossession made by luring debtor to a meeting to con-
tinue good-faith settlement discussions). See generally Braucher, supra note 50, at 587-91
(discussing cases and concluding that they “leave confusion about what sorts of tricks are
impermissible”); CLARK, supra note 49, ¶ 4.05[2][b], at 4-85 to 4-86, 4-88 to 4-89 (ob-
serving that “a little stealth is all in the game of repossession,” but describing some cases
finding impermissible “chicanery”); ALPHONSE M. SOUILLANTE & JOHN R. FONSECA, THE
MODERN LAW OF COMMERCIAL PRACTICES 1368-69 (Supp. 1997) (observing that consent
gained by trickery is not meaningful, but that “[t]he majority of cases liberally interpret
what ‘breach of the peace’ means in favor of the creditor”).
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the contents of users’ hard drives, suggests that individuals also assess in-
trusion in other ways.55 (Imagine, for example, that a team of high-tech
repo men had just used a transporter device to “beam” your sofa out of
your living room and back to the furniture store. It would be difficult for
the creditor to convince you that no intrusion had occurred.) The law of
privacy agrees that intrusion need not be violent to be actionable; noncon-
sensual “intrusion upon seclusion” is actionable without regard to the in-
truder’s use of force.56 Assessing the degree of intrusion allowable as a
matter of commercial law, therefore, requires us to do more than simply
weigh the risk of physical injury to persons or property against the licen-
sor’s countervailing proprietary rights.
The fact that section 2B-715 also prohibits self-help repossession in
situations presenting a risk of injury to information, independent of any
injury to persons or tangible property, indicates some recognition that
physical harm is not the only kind of harm threatened by unilateral acts of
private enforcement.57 Article 2B makes clear, however, that the drafters
are far more concerned with intangible harms to commercial interests than
with intangible harms to individuals. Thus, section 2B-715 includes spe-
cial protections for the licensee whose trade secrets become entangled
with information “belonging to” the licensor, but includes no such protec-
tions for the licensee whose diary or great American novel meets a similar
fate.58 The Reporter’s Notes to sections 2B-310 and 2B-715 do not even
                                                                                                                        
55. See Peter H. Lewis, Conspiracy Buffs See Things to Worry About in Microsoft’s
Electronic Software Registry, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1995, at D3.
56. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652B (1977); id. § 652B (listing deci-
sions recognizing this tort theory from 31 states and the District of Columbia). See gener-
ally ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 57-61
(1988) (discussing the sources and rationales for the concept of privacy rights in one’s
home). Similarly, the U3C represents a judgment that nonconsensual intrusion into a private
home, whether or not violent, is objectionable in its own right. See supra note 52 and ac-
companying text.
57. See U.C.C. § 2B-715(b)(2) (July 24-31, 1998 Draft).
58. See id. §§ 2B-715(e) (prohibiting repossession if licensor’s information is so
commingled with licensee’s information that separation is infeasible), 2B-715(f) (according
repossession rights to licensee who provides information to licensor subject to use restric-
tions). Neither restriction would appear to apply to word processing files containing docu-
ments created by licensees. Cf. U.C.C. § 2B-310(c) (July 24-31, 1998 Draft) (excluding
from the definition of authorized “electronic regulation of performance” restrictions that
interfere with a licensee’s access to his or her own information “by means other than by use
of the licensor’s information or informational rights”). By contrast, a creditor who takes
personal property of the debtor during a repossession—such as tools or other belongings
left in the trunk of a car—must return the property quickly or pay conversion damages for
loss of use. See CLARK, supra note 49, ¶ 12.05[3][b].
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acknowledge that the law of privacy exists, or that “privacy” is a state or
characteristic that has independent value for individuals and for society.
Determining whether and how privacy concerns should influence the
law of electronic self-help requires defining the interests that “privacy”
protects and the senses in which it is subject to invasion. Volumes have
been written on this subject, and the exact provenance of privacy is still
unsettled. For purposes of this article, however, it is sufficient to note that
privacy is broadly acknowledged as having decisional, informational, and
spatial dimensions.59 Plainly, the self-help rights provided by Article 2B
do not directly implicate privacy concerns related to intimate personal de-
cision-making.60 Self-help might entail collection and revelation of infor-
mation about an individual licensee’s activities. The privacy implications
of such monitoring are clear, and are thoroughly treated elsewhere; I will
not repeat that analysis here.61 My concern here is with the new kind of
self-help that digital technologies allow—self-help that consists solely of
“dumb,” hard-wired prevention of unauthorized conduct. Although this
kind of self-help does not appear to raise informational privacy concerns,
that does not end the inquiry.62 Whether such self-help implicates privacy
in the spatial sense remains to be considered.
The common law of privacy protects only those expectations of pri-
vacy that are “reasonable.”63 One possible understanding of “reasonable-
ness” in the context of assertedly private spaces is that the state of the art
of self-help technology determines (and limits) the expectations of privacy
that consumers can reasonably have. This is not entirely far-fetched; tech-
nology plays an important role in shaping privacy-related rules and
norms.64 Yet if reasonable expectations are defined solely by the limits of
                                                                                                                        
59. See, e.g., Sheldon W. Halpern, Rethinking the Right of Privacy: Dignity, Decency,
and the Law’s Limitations, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 539, 541 n.12 (1991); JULIE C. INNESS,
PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 56-69 (1992); Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in
Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1202-03 (1998).
60. They might do so indirectly—if, for example, a licensor attempted to prevent use
of its products to inform or facilitate such decisions. However, this type of privacy violation
probably could not be accomplished without a concurrent invasion of informational or spa-
tial privacy interests.
61. For discussion of the privacy concerns and other concerns raised by monitoring
intellectual activities, see Cohen, supra note 9, at 994-1019. For more general discussion of
informational privacy issues, see Kang, supra note 59; see also Friedman, supra note 42 at
1153, 1163-64.
62. See Friedman, supra note 42, at, 1153, 1163-64.
63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmts. c-d (1977).
64. Cf. Jeffrey Reiman, Driving to the Panopticon, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 27, 32 (describing the level of privacy enjoyed by individuals as a function
of both formal (legal) and material (physical) conditions).
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technological possibility, privacy has a bleak future. Individuals’ legal en-
titlement to privacy will simply recede as the technologies of intrusion ad-
vance. This approach also rests on an important, and misguided, assump-
tion concerning the unidirectional nature of technological progress. Tech-
nology can evolve in privacy-destroying or privacy-protecting ways. The
actual path of technological evolution will depend on many factors, in-
cluding the priorities of stakeholders and the processes by which
stakeholders are identified and consulted.65 To say that electronic self-help
is legitimate because it is possible ignores the degree to which both “pri-
vacy” and “technology” are normative as well as positive constructs—
functions of the laws and mores of society as well as the laws of physics.
Another possible interpretation of “reasonableness,” suggested by
cases involving alleged intrusion upon seclusion via remote listening and
viewing devices, is that an intrusion into private space is actionable only if
it renders the space accessible, or potentially so, to a human observer.66
This answer also is unsatisfactory, however, because it depends, ulti-
mately, on informational privacy concerns. Privacy protects certain spaces
not only to shield personal behaviors from observation by others, but also
to preserve a zone of autonomy from interference by others.67 Freedom
                                                                                                                        
65. Cf. Cohen, supra note 7, at 398-402 (arguing that technology both constitutes and
is constituted by social values and institutions); Lawrence Lessig, Governance 5-9 (Aug.
23, 1998 Draft) (arguing that choices about the technical architectures of cyberspace are,
inevitably, also choices about the regularity of cyberspace behavior)
<http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/works/lessig/NY_q_d2.pdf>.
66. Compare, e.g., Marks v. Bell Tel. Co., 331 A.2d 424, 431 (Pa. 1975) (holding that
secret taping of conversations in police station holding room not actionable as invasion of
privacy because recordings were not actually replayed and were routinely erased several
weeks after being made), with, e.g., Amati v. City of Woodstock, 829 F. Supp. 998, 1010-
11 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (holding that secret taping of conversations actionable as invasion of
privacy whether or not anyone actually listened to the recordings, because “[o]ne would
never obtain the full benefits accorded to a private place if he or she reasonably believed
someone would or could be listening”), Harkey v. Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74, 76 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1983) (holding that see-through panels above stalls in women’s bathroom at roller
skating rink constituted invasion of privacy whether or not panels actually were used to
view plaintiffs), and Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239, 243 (N.H. 1965) (holding that
listening device installed by landlord in tenants’ bedroom constituted invasion of privacy
whether or not landlord ever used it).
67. See, e.g., Marks, 331 A.2d at 433 (Pomeroy, J., concurring in the result) (“The tort
of intrusion is designed to protect an individual, not against what other human beings think
of him, but rather against the very act of interference with his seclusion.”); Edward J.
Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, in
PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 156, 165 (Ferdinand David
Schoeman, ed. 1984) (“The fundamental fact is that our Western culture defines individual-
ity as including the right to be free from certain types of intrusions. This measure of per-
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from observation means little without freedom from outside control. Be-
cause autonomy interests may be violated even if informational interests
are not, whether a human observer gleans any direct information from an
autonomy-destroying intrusion is irrelevant. It is worth noting, too, that
“dumb” intrusions are not divorced from human agency, but only sepa-
rated from it in time. In a sense, the intrusion (or at least its but-for cause)
occurred much earlier, when the licensor determined that consumers in
their private homes and offices would be allowed to take certain actions
but not others.68
It is true that “dumb” self-help is a different kind of intrusion than that
caused by human perception. Yet to characterize it as “merely” a commu-
nication surely would go too far. A dinnertime telemarketing phone call
may annoy, but a spurned telemarketer cannot turn off software that hap-
pens to be running on a personal computer in one’s study, or deny access
to copies of digital works stored there. Electronic self-help is a communi-
cation that suspends or restricts preexisting access to stored digital infor-
mation; as such, it is qualitatively different than an unwanted telephone
call that has no further effect.69
                                                                                                                        
sonal isolation and personal control over the conditions of its abandonment is of the very
essence of personal freedom and dignity ….”); Thomas Scanlon, Thomson on Privacy, 4
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 315, 317 (1975) (“The interests to which an account of privacy must
refer thus include, in addition to specific interests in not being seen, overheard, etc., broader
interests in having a zone of privacy in which we can carry out our activities without the
necessity of being continually alert for possible observers, listeners, etc.”); cf. Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment protects “the right
to satisfy [one’s] intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of [one’s] own home”);
MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 56-63 (1982) (arguing that property
rights in the home are a necessary constituent of individual personhood); Claudia W.
Tuchman, Note, Does Privacy Have Four Walls? Salvaging Stanley v. Georgia, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 2267, 2283-84 (1994) (characterizing constitutionally-protected privacy as “the
right of an individual to conduct a private life free from state interference”).
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures serves simi-
lar values. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1885) (“It is not the break-
ing of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the of-
fence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty,
and private property ….”); see also Michael Adler, Cyberspace General Searches, and
Digital Contraband: The Fourth Amendment and the Net-Wide Search, 105 YALE L.J.
1093, 1108-13 (1996) (emphasizing importance of the home as a zone of autonomy).
68. Technically, of course, the licensor and the consumer “agreed” to the restrictions;
for discussion of whether it makes sense to treat these restrictions as the subject of genuine
mutual consent, and why it might not, see infra Part IV.
69. According to the Restatement view, even telephone calls may constitute intrusion
upon seclusion, depending on the circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §
652B cmt. b, illus. 5 (1977).
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Telephone, electric, and gas companies supply a somewhat closer par-
allel. These entities have the undisputed power to disconnect service to
private homes and offices. However, they do not have the power to reach
inside the home or office and disable lawfully acquired products, such as
lamps, stoves, and telephones, merely because they require electricity, gas,
or telephone wire to function. In addition, public utilities’ power to exer-
cise self-help is limited in other ways. The telephone company may not
disconnect a consumer for making fun of the company, nor for taking
apart the telephone to try to build a better one; it may do so only for non-
payment, and only after providing notice and a grace period.70 In contrast,
section 2B-310 and (depending on judicial interpretation) possibly section
2B-715 authorize intrusion into private individuals’ homes, offices and
computer systems for a wide variety of misconduct, without prior notice,
as a matter of routine business practice. Thus, to decide whether the intru-
sions-by-communication authorized by Article 2B are reasonable based on
a public utility analogy, we also must consider whether their subject mat-
ter justifies their scope.
B. Self-Help, Notice and “Materiality”
Self-help historically has been understood, and rightly so, as a drastic
remedy. For this reason, existing commercial law requires that the range
of conduct that will trigger self-help behavior be clearly defined. For
leases, the language of Article 2A sets these initial limits. A lessor of tan-
gible property may engage in self-help only if the lessee “wrongfully re-
jects or revokes acceptance of goods or fails to make a payment when due
or repudiates” all or part of the contract, or otherwise “substantially im-
pairs” its value.71 The language of Article 9, in contrast, is relatively open-
ended; it allows self-help repossession by the holder of a security interest
upon the debtor’s “default.”72 Because Article 9 does not define “default,”
courts have required that the events alleged as default be defined as such
in the security agreement.73 Moreover, courts in a number of states have
                                                                                                                        
70. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 779, 779.1 (West Supp. 1998); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 16-262d (West 1988 & Supp. 1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 363-B:1
(1995); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 47-32 (McKinney 1989). Public utilities in general are
heavily regulated. Thus, taking seriously an argument that information providers are “like”
public utilities is unlikely to lead us to a model law that emphasizes “freedom of contract.”
71. U.C.C. §§ 2A-523(1), (3)(a) (emphasis added), 2A-525(2), (3) (1990).
72. U.C.C. § 9-503 (1972).
73. See CLARK, supra note 49, ¶ 4.02[1]; 9 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND ET AL., UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 9-503:1, at 667-69 (1997); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note
45, § 25-2, at 902. When events of default are not specifically defined, courts will require
failure of payment or other clearly “material” breach to justify repossession. See, e.g.,
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cabined contractual events of default by imposing objective limits on
“catchall” belief-in-insecurity clauses;74 by restricting the use of insecu-
rity-acceleration clauses and requiring clear notice of acceleration in all
relevant documents;75 by limiting the use of demand clauses if the contract
also contains enumerated events of default;76 and by applying principles of
estoppel to bar repossession or acceleration by creditors in some circum-
stances notwithstanding the contract language.77 In U3C jurisdictions,
these restrictions are codified; a creditor may not accelerate the debt, but
instead must afford both notice and an opportunity to cure the deficient
installment(s), and may proceed with self-help repossession only upon
objective evidence of “significant impairment of the prospect for payment
or realization on the collateral.”78 These restrictions are designed to miti-
gate the severity of the self-help remedy by ensuring that self-help will not
follow minor or debatable infractions, and by alerting consumers to the
kinds of conduct that create risk.
Measured against existing law and practice, the self-help provisions of
proposed Article 2B require much less advance notice, and authorize self-
help in an even broader range of circumstances. Section 2B-310, in par-
ticular, allows electronic regulation of any behavior considered inconsis-
tent with the contract, without contractual notice in many cases.79 In con-
trast, although the Article 2B drafting committee had previously approved
post-cancellation self-help provisions without any materiality restriction,
the new version of section 2B-715 requires either that the breach be “ma-
terial” or that the license expressly define it as grounds to cancel.80 Even
                                                                                                                        
Bankwest, N.A. v. Groseclose, 535 N.W.2d 86 (S.D. 1995); Stillwell Welding Co. v. Colt
Trucking, 741 P.2d 598 (Wyo. 1987); CLARK, supra note 49, ¶ 4.02[1].
74. See CLARK, supra note 49, ¶ 4.02[2][a], at 4-9.
75. See id. at 4-8 to 4-9, 4-13.
76. See id. ¶ 4.02[2][a], at 4-12.
77. See id. ¶¶ 4.02[3], 12.05[1][b]-[c]. Each of the above judicially-developed limita-
tions is informed by the general duty of good faith required by U.C.C. section 1-203. In
general, however, “§ 1-203 does not support a cause of action where no other basis exists
under the U.C.C.” CLARK, supra note 49, ¶ 4.02[4], at S4-18; see also id. ¶ 4.02[2][b], at 4-
11 (citing U.C.C. § 1-208 (1995)) (noting that § 1-203 does not limit the use of demand
notes, which by definition may be called for any reason or no reason). Article 2B appears to
follow the same approach.
78. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE art. 5, §§ 5-109, -110, -111(a) (1974); see
CLARK, supra note 49, ¶ 12.05[1][a].
79. See U.C.C. § 2B-310 & Reporter’s Note 3 (July 24-31, 1998 Draft). Arguably,
Article 2B’s provision for the unenforceability of unconscionable terms offers a way out of
this difficulty. See id. § 2B-110. It is unlikely, however, that this is the result the drafters
intended.
80. See U.C.C. §§ 2B-702, 2B-715 (July 24-31, 1998 Draft).
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these restrictions, however, do very little to bring Article 2B in line with
the existing law of self-help repossession.
First, as described above, existing law requires written notice of the
possibility of electronic self-help in all cases, not just some. This is true
for electronic self-help as well. Every court that has considered a chal-
lenge to electronic self-help repossession of licensed software has indi-
cated that in view of its drastic nature, electronic self-help requires prior
contractual authorization.81 The Reporter’s Notes to sections 2B-310 and
2B-715 do not mention these decisions at all.82 The omission is hard to
fathom. Given the severity of the consequences and the inability of most
consumers to evade them, lack of written notice of the possibility of elec-
tronic self-help is simply unfair. (If a creditor considered itself entitled to
“beam” your sofa out of your living room, or to prevent you from install-
ing new cushion covers, you almost certainly would prefer to know this up
front.) It is worth noting, too, that none of the cases concerning electronic
self-help has involved a non-negotiated, mass market contract; thus, no
court was required to consider whether the “notice” afforded consumers
by standard-form provisions is enough to validate electronic self-help. It is
                                                                                                                        
81. See American Computer Trust Leasing v. Jack Farrell Implement Co., 763 F.
Supp. 1473 (D. Minn. 1991) (rejecting tort claims for electronic deactivation because plain-
tiff’s contract with software vendor gave vendor the right to deactivate software if plaintiff
failed to make payments), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. American Computer Trust
Leasing v. Boerboom Int’l, Inc., 967 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1992); Clayton X-Ray Co. v. Pro-
fessional Sys. Corp., 812 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming award of punitive
damages against software vendor that deactivated software, even though plaintiff was liable
to vendor for failing to pay vendor’s bill, because vendor had no “legal right” to deactivate
software); Franks & Son, Inc. v. Information Solutions, No. 88-C-1474E (N.D. Okla. Dec.
23, 1989), 1989 Cptr. Indus. Litig. Rep. (Andrews) 8927-35 (Jan. 23, 1989) (rejecting soft-
ware vendor’s argument that U.C.C. Article 9 authorized deactivation of software because,
inter alia, contract did not disclose deactivation code’s existence); see also Werner, Zaroff,
Slotnick, Stern & Askenazy v. Lewis, 588 N.Y.S.2d 960 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1992) (affirming
punitive damages award against software consultant who secretly included code that caused
plaintiff’s software to shut down, in the hope that plaintiff would offer him a service con-
tract to fix the problem, and noting that consultant had “no right” to include the deactivation
code); Art Stone Theatrical Corp. v. Technical Programming & Sys. Support, Inc., 549
N.Y.S.2d 789 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (holding that vendor that removed essential software
code from plaintiff’s system pending resolution of contract dispute could not claim benefit
of general release agreement negotiated while code was being withheld if plaintiff could
prove duress). Perhaps the most well-known case involving electronic self-help reposses-
sion, Revlon v. Logisticon, Inc., No. 70533 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. filed Oct. 22,
1990), settled before the court could rule on plaintiff’s contract and tort claims. See Gary J.
Edwards, Self-Help Repossession of Software: Should Repossession Be Available Under
Article 2B of the U.C.C.?, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 763, 778-79 (1997).
82. U.C.C. § 2B-310, Reporter’s Notes; id. § 2B-715, Reporter’s Notes.
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at least an open question whether the severity of the remedy justifies
heightened notice requirements.83
Second, even apart from the issue of notice, the self-help rights af-
forded by Article 2B are extremely broad. In part, this is the result of spe-
cific drafting decisions; even section 2B-715’s materiality restriction is
virtually meaningless because Article 2B’s definition of “material” breach
is so broad that it encompasses almost any breach.84 In part, however, it is
a consequence of the open-ended nature of “informational rights” as con-
ceived by licensors and the Article 2B drafting committee. Both Article
2A and Article 9 inherently concern a narrower range of potential trans-
gressions than Article 2B. The typical Article 2A lease or Article 9 secu-
rity agreement is concerned only with behaviors that bear on the debtor’s
financial soundness or on the availability of the collateral to satisfy the
debt.85 In practice, a default most often will consist of failure to make re-
quired payments. Article 2B, in contrast, contemplates a seemingly limit-
less range of restrictions on the uses that licensors may make of creative
and informational works, and appears to contemplate electronic enforce-
ment of most such restrictions—which, in turn, exacerbates the notice
problem still further. An expansive conception of breach need not, how-
ever, automatically translate into an expanded scope for self-help. At
minimum, before adopting this robust conception of private ordering, we
should weigh its merits and demerits and consider other possible ap-
proaches.
Affording licensors such broad powers of self-help is enormously
problematic, for several reasons. First, the determination of breach (or, as
in section 2B-310, behavior “inconsistent with” the license) is not always
as clear-cut as sections 2B-310 and 2B-715 imply. Deciding whether a
consumer has failed to pay is relatively easy; for other license provisions,
however, the determination of breach may require resolution of difficult
questions of fact or law.86 Appointing the licensor judge, jury, and execu-
                                                                                                                        
83. See supra note 40. As discussed infra Part V.C., the Supreme Court has held that
private self-help repossession activity does not implicate constitutional due process protec-
tion. Even if that rule holds for the self-help authorized by Article 2B, a threshold level of
notice to the consumer might be required as a matter of sound commercial policy.
84. See U.C.C. § 2B-109(b)-(c) (July 24-31, 1998 Draft) (defining “material” breach
to include any conduct likely to cause substantial harm; any conduct substantially likely to
cause substantial deprivation of an expected benefit; failure to perform an “essential ele-
ment” of the contract; the cumulative effect of nonmaterial breaches; and anything else de-
fined in the contract as material).
85. See U.C.C. § 9-102 (1972).
86. Consider, for example, a license authorizing the customer to adapt and debug, but
not materially alter, a copyrighted software program.
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tioner on these questions seems singularly unwise. Second, the alleged in-
consistency or breach may consist of conduct that copyright law permits.
A licensee might trigger digital policing mechanisms while trying to fix
bugs in licensed software, or using the licensed information to create a
classroom handout or critical commentary.87 In such a case, the licensee
has a defense—copyright preemption—that is unavailable to the person
who simply has failed to pay for goods received, and the outcome may
turn—as the drafters themselves note—on the resolution of difficult ques-
tions of federal law.88
One obvious solution to the overbreadth problems in sections 2B-310
and 2B-715 is to authorize self-help only for the same kinds of misconduct
that have traditionally warranted it: failure to pay and other conduct that
substantially impairs the value of the covered property based on an objec-
tive standard.89 In the case of section 2B-715, courts could simply inter-
pret “materiality” this way. Neither approach appears to have occurred to
the drafters, for reasons that also are self-evident: such restrictions would
diminish Article 2B’s utility as a vehicle for private ordering of rights in
information. Yet at the same time, the drafters’ decision to impose some
sort of materiality restriction, however vague, on self-help under section
2B-715 suggests a recognition, however murky, that wholly unrestrained
private ordering might be bad policy. A narrow understanding of “materi-
ality” makes the most sense, both in terms of fairness to consumers and in
terms of broader societal concerns about the rule of law. Section 2B-310,
however, contains no express materiality restriction, and as we have seen,
there are other significant differences between the self-help powers con-
ferred by section 2B-310 and those conferred by 2B-715. Thus, to finish
the project undertaken in this Part, we must consider the drafters’ implicit
assumption that “regulation of performance” ex ante is fundamentally dif-
ferent than “self-help” ex post.
                                                                                                                        
87. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 117 (1994); Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 510 U.S.
569 (1994).
88. The licensee may have a First Amendment defense as well. See infra Part V.B.
89. Thus, for example, self-help might be reasonable in the case of a licensee who
makes and distributes multiple copies of a covered work outside an academic or research
setting, but unreasonable in the case of a licensee who makes one or two copies, or who
distributes multiple copies within an academic or research setting. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1994) (listing education and research among uses of copyrighted works that are likely to be
fair); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1985) (holding home
videotaping of broadcast programming for personal viewing purposes to be a fair use).
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C. Self-Help in Time
Sections 2B-715 and 2B-310 diverge markedly with regard to materi-
ality and notice; this suggests that the drafters see an important difference
between the two types of self-help. This difference follows fairly straight-
forwardly from the libertarian notion of freedom of contract. From this
perspective, it is conceivable that wholly unfettered rights of “reposses-
sion,” or post-breach self-help, might unacceptably blur the line between
the rule of law and the state of nature. A central purpose of the social con-
tract, after all, is to eliminate the chaos and uncertainty that would arise in
a society without formal systems of dispute resolution. Electronic regula-
tion, however (or so the argument goes), invokes the law of the market,
not the law of the jungle. “Regulation of performance” is simply a high-
tech way of describing the licensor’s right to determine the features of its
product. The restrictions become part of the product, which consumers can
take or leave.90
The freedom of contract argument for unfettered electronic regulation
of performance is simple and elegant—and breathtakingly sophomoric.
First, it conflates choice with submission and product capabilities with
control of behavior. Your vacuum cleaner cannot fly, or clean your oven,
and you have no particular right to one that can. However, except in spe-
cial cases governed by the patent laws, within private spaces you may use
or modify a lawfully-acquired vacuum cleaner in any way you see fit.
There might be questions about liability for injuries arising from unin-
tended uses, but that is a separate matter well within the scope of existing
contract and tort law concerning warranties, warnings, and disclaimers.
Second, the freedom-of-contract argument conflates digital code with
“contract,” and calls the result a purely private form of ordering exempt
from public policy limits—although “contract” is not and never has been
exempt from such limits.91 Section 2B-310 sanctions the control of people,
not products; it negates agency, and calls the result freedom.
Theory aside, consider (again) your living room sofa. Suppose, first,
that the purchase agreement states that no more than three people may sit
                                                                                                                        
90. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Terms of
use are no less a part of ‘the product’ than are the size of the database and the speed with
which the software compiles listings. Competition among vendors, not judicial revision of a
package’s contents, is how consumers are protected in a market economy.”); Friedman,
supra note 42, at 1163-64; Nimmer, supra note 3, at 838-54.
91. See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach (Sept.
20, 1998 Draft) <http://cyber.harvard.edu/works/lessig/LNC_Q_D2.PDF>. On the remedial
significance of this distinction, see infra Part VI. As the existence of tort law demonstrates,
product design also has never been exempt from public policy limits.
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on the sofa at a time. When a fourth person (say, perhaps, the small child
of an adult sofa-sitter) attempts to join the others, the sofa vanishes,
dumping its erstwhile occupants onto the floor. This is repossession, swift
and (largely) bloodless.92 Now suppose, instead, that the child’s approach
activates an invisible force field, such that the child may not sit while all
three adults remain. There is no repossession (the sofa remains) and no
loss of “use” (as defined by the licensor), but only regulation of use. There
is little risk of physical injury, and little need for invasion of privacy in the
informational sense. Yet I suspect most readers will feel that from the
standpoint of personal autonomy within a space hitherto conceived as pri-
vate, there is not much difference between the two scenarios.93 Article 2B
stands for the proposition that intellectual property is different enough
from sofas that licensors can, with straight faces, propound and demand
acceptance of precisely the latter sort of regime.94
Is there any consideration that might justify broader rights of private
ordering and self-help repossession, and a correspondingly restricted sense
of individual autonomy, as to information products than as to tangible arti-
cles of commerce? The answer, according to the drafters of Article 2B,
seems to be that unauthorized use is reconceived as an invasion of the in-
formation provider’s “property” interests in the work, as distinct from the
particular copy the licensee happens to possess.95 It is true that intellectual
property and sofas are not entirely the same—sofas are not public goods,
and cannot be costlessly copied—but the need to prevent market-
destroying appropriation is a very different sort of argument, and it is far
from clear that it justifies the full range of autonomy-destroying practices
that section 2B-310 would allow.96 Moreover, the fact that the licensor
may have “informational rights” in the licensed subject matter also cuts
the other way, because “informational rights” are limited by law in ways
that rights in chattels are not. A copyrighted work is not “property” in the
same sense as land or consumer goods, because the public has protectable
                                                                                                                        
92. Section 2B-715 would authorize suit for any personal injury that might result. See
U.C.C. § 2B-715 (July 24-31, 1998 Draft).
93. I am indebted to James Davis of the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center for inspir-
ing this train of thought.
94. Or, still more frighteningly, that electronic regulation of sofa use would be wholly
legitimate.
95. Cf. Trotter Hardy, The Ancient Doctrine of Trespass to Web Sites, 1996 J. ONLINE
L. art. 7 (1996); Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 217 (1996).
96. This argument is considered further infra Part IV.
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interests in certain public-domain aspects of copyrighted works at the out-
set.97
Even the common law of property historically has recognized certain
public rights of access to or across the property of another.98 Most closely
analogous is the public trust doctrine, which preserves a right of access
across privately-owned land when necessary to reach beaches and other
areas that the law considers to be commonly-owned.99 Similarly, the ex-
ceptions and exclusions in copyright law preserve public access to the lin-
guistic, cultural, and scientific commons. The common law of property
also recognizes public rights of privacy while on the property of another;
for example, landlords may not use listening devices or trick mirrors to
spy on their tenants, or install viewing devices in public restroom stalls.100
In short, the fact that something is “property” does not, without more, con-
fer on its owner rights of absolute, unqualified control.101 The scope of
permissible private ordering of others’ behavior within private spaces
should be a subject of conversation for society generally, not a unilateral
decision for information providers.
In sum, Article 2B proposes to arrogate to private information provid-
ers the power to reach into customers’ homes and offices and literally
shape their behavior—in many cases without even the courtesy of express
                                                                                                                        
97. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14 (discussing public-domain status of
facts, ideas, and functional principles). “Informational rights” in noncopyrightable works
are even narrower. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16 (discussing data misappro-
priation law and copyright preemption).
98. Common law rights against trespassers are not and never have been absolute. One
may not, for example, use deadly force against a trespasser unless one’s own life is threat-
ened. See, e.g., Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971). And one may trespass on
another’s property to save one’s own life. See, e.g., Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124
N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910). (A trespasser under these circumstances will be held responsible
for damages, if any, but that is a separate question. See id. at 222.)
99. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988); JACK H. ARCHER
ET AL., THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND THE MANAGEMENT OF AMERICA’S COASTS
(1994); Kathryn R. Heidt, Cleaning Up Your Act: Efficiency Considerations in the Battle
for the Debtor’s Assets in Toxic Waste Bankruptcies, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 819, 860 (1988)
(“The concept here is that there are certain rights in the public that cannot be conveyed by
the state.”); cf. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inher-
ently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986) (describing the origins of and justifi-
cations for common law doctrines that vest collective property rights in the “unorganized”
public). I am indebted to Dan Burk for suggesting this analogy.
100. See, e.g., Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396 (5th Cir. 1974); Hamberger v. Eastman,
206 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1965); Harkey v. Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
101. For further discussion of the origins and errors of this “control theory” of prop-
erty, see Cohen, supra note 7, at 343-53.
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contractual notice. Even if self-enforcing digital contracts did not impli-
cate federal copyright law, these new technological methods for regulating
the use of information products and effectuating self-help repossession
would raise important questions about the permissible scope of private en-
forcement activity. Ultimately, Article 2B requires us to decide whether
“self-help” as a legal construct exists solely for the narrow purpose of
protecting vendors and consumers from avoidable financial harm, or also
for the broader purpose of allowing vendors to shape the behavior, even
within private spaces, of those with whom they deal. That such self-help
concerns intellectual property makes it more, not less, troubling, because
private ownership of intellectual property traditionally has been conceived
as less complete than private ownership of chattels. These questions de-
serve far more careful consideration than they appear to have received.
Platitudes about the need for enforcement of contracts are simply inade-
quate to justify such a radical reallocation of authority to monitor and
control individual conduct.
IV. THEORY: CONSENT, EFFICIENCY, AND NORMS
The electronic regulation and self-help provisions of Article 2B also
cannot be justified under any of the prevailing scholarly accounts of self-
help and its role in the fabric of commercial exchange. Although these
theories run the gamut from freedom of contract to economic efficiency,
they share a common failing. All of the theories ignore or assume away
the structural peculiarities of the consumer mass market, and thus fail to
recognize that neither consent nor efficiency can be judged in the abstract.
In addition, theoretical approaches that privilege allocative efficiency to
the exclusion of all other considerations are inappropriate given the public
good nature of creative and informational works. When mass market
transactions in information products are considered in context, theoretical
justifications for unfettered private electronic ordering become difficult to
sustain.
Several legal scholars and at least one court have sought to justify en-
forcing contract terms governing use of creative and informational works
by reference to individual freedom of contract. Consumers, the theory
posits, are free to accept or reject the terms offered in the market. If they
consent to license agreements that abrogate the user privileges established
by copyright law, it must be because they find such agreements desir-
able.102
                                                                                                                        
102. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996); Bell, supra
note 17, at 588-89 n.142; Friedman, supra note 42, at 1155-57; Maureen O’Rourke, Copy-
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In the mass market context, however, the argument from consent is far
too simple. The market system established by the U.C.C. bears little re-
semblance to the atomistic market of the neoclassical, libertarian para-
digm, which presumes perfect information and fully-informed consent as
to every term of the deal.103 The U.C.C. was designed to allow commercial
transactions to proceed without exact specification of every term, and in
particular to obviate the need for bargaining over the allocation of prod-
uct-related risks.104 Article 2B’s mass market license provisions continue
this approach; they are designed (among other things) to facilitate market
exchange in the absence of complete information. Particularly for complex
products (or “ordinary” products that have been subjected to complex
contract terms) the argument that the structure of the typical mass market
transaction enables voluntary, informed exchanges with respect to most
terms other than price is sheer fantasy.105 This is especially true for im-
plicit contract terms, such as the electronic “regulation” of behavior “in-
consistent with the agreement” authorized by section 2B-310.106 This is
not to say (yet) anything about the legitimacy of particular mass market
terms expressly or implicitly authorizing self-help, but only that a mean-
ingful justification for broad powers of self-help must proceed without re-
liance on a hypothetical state of affairs that bears no resemblance to real-
ity.
                                                                                                                        
right Preemption After the ProCD Case: A Market-Based Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 53, 83-87 (1997).
103. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 186-93 (2d ed.
1997) (describing requirements for a perfectly-functioning market); cf. DeLong & Froom-
kin, supra note 7 (“[T]oday’s purchaser of, say, a suite of software programs is faced with
needs and constraints that a metric designed to explain the market for pins may leave us
poorly prepared to understand.”).
104. See Cohen, supra note 7 at 322-28; Rice, supra note 17, at 564-65.
105. See Cohen, supra note 7 at 322-28; Victor P. Goldberg, Institutional Change and
the Quasi-Invisible Hand, 17 J.L. & ECON. 461, 483-85 (1974); William T. Vukowich,
Lawyers and the Standard Form Contract System: A Model Rule That Should Have Been, 6
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 799, 800-11 (1993); cf. Goldberg, supra note 15, at 484-91 (charac-
terizing the legal institution of the standard form as a societal decision to delegate most
commercial rulemaking to private firms). To the contrary, as Vukowich notes, purveyors of
standard forms often simply refuse to allow consumers to review the fine print before con-
cluding the transaction. Vukowich, supra, at 806-07. Article 2B would validate this prac-
tice, creating obvious practical difficulties for even the most determined comparison shop-
pers. See U.C.C. §§ 2B-111, 2B-112(b)-(c) & Reporter’s Notes 2, 5 (July 24-31, 1998
Draft) (allowing disclosure of terms after purchase but prior to use of the product).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 21-24.
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At the other end of the epistemological spectrum lie efficiency-based
arguments of varying degrees of sophistication.107 The simplest economic
rationale for allowing self-help repossession turns on the seller’s opportu-
nity cost. Creditors seeking expanded self-help powers typically have ar-
gued that requiring them to incur litigation costs, or to charge off as losses
items of collateral too small to justify litigation, will raise the price of
credit for other, law-abiding consumers.108
This “lost-value” justification for self-help does not apply as neatly to
intangible intellectual property, however, both because of the public good
nature of creative and informational works and because of the broad scope
of self-help contemplated under Article 2B. First, the “lost value” attribut-
able to a product whose value lies chiefly in its public good aspect is in-
herently speculative. Failure to recover a car after the buyer defaults pre-
cludes the secured creditor from recovering a portion of its investment;
failure to recover a copy of a creative or informational work does not pre-
clude the information provider from realizing a profit on the work.109 Par-
ticularly in the case of digital works, the supply of copies is infinite and
virtually costless, and there is no necessary or inevitable relationship be-
tween the price charged to consumers and the value invested in each copy.
The point is not that information providers have no claim to remuneration
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Cohen, supra note 7, at 322-34, 343-53 (arguing that libertarianism and neoclassical eco-
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In a relative sense, some consumers may end up subsidizing others’ uses, in that the
prices charged them may be greater than they otherwise would have been. It is appropriate
to consider whether these relative subsidies, or quasi-subsidies, represent good policy in a
system intended to promote the production and distribution of this particular type of public
good. But that is a very different question. See infra text accompanying notes 142-47.
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for copies of works—plainly, they do and should—but only that “lost
value” arguments are less compelling in this context; thus, it seems odd
that information providers should demand greater powers of self-help than
are available to purveyors of tangible goods.110
Second and more important, Article 2B authorizes self-help in a wide
variety of circumstances unconnected to failure of payment or financial
insecurity—for example, unauthorized modification of software or copy-
ing of content for educational purposes.111 Even if lost profits warrant
electronic self-help when consumers fail to pay, that does not justify using
lost profits to bootstrap electronic self-help rights in other cases. Here
again there is a gray area, though: if the information provider wishes to
charge a fee for every use of a work, or to charge different users different
types of fees, may not any case be converted into one of failure to pay?
The answer is complicated. In a recent essay, Terry Fisher argues that al-
lowing information providers the freedom to price discriminate may bene-
fit society—except when ceding greater control to information providers
threatens other important social values.112 Plainly, price discrimination
will benefit marginal consumers; plainly too, there will be difficult cases
involving marginal sellers for whom the extra profit would make the dif-
ference.113 But the need to consider other social policies—discussed at
greater length below—means that information providers cannot be the
ones to decide when certain uses may be restricted, or when electronic
self-help may follow. Decisions about privatizing information policy must
be based on more than the licensor’s desire for additional profit.
Other economic theorists focus on the general deterrence value of self-
help rules and practices. Robert Scott argues that the threat of self-help
plays an important role in inducing non-defaulting consumers to pay their
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debts.114 He characterizes the right of self-help repossession as an eco-
nomic hostage offered by the debtor in a game-theoretic bargaining envi-
ronment to signal the debtor’s commitment to pay.115 In turn, the creditor
signals its commitment to enforce the debtor’s promise by precommitting
to “a sequence of discrete steps … each act escalating incrementally.”116
Scott contends that self-help remedies as a class are important to a credi-
tor’s ability to maintain a reputation as an enforcer of promises. The chal-
lenge, then, is to “design a pattern of reciprocal commitments that effec-
tively constrains the debtor without unduly tempting the creditor.”117
If we accept Scott’s argument as sufficient in principle to justify some
self-help practices, the question still remains how Article 2B’s electronic
regulation and self-help provisions fare under his “unduly tempting” stan-
dard, which acknowledges that some forms of self-help may create unac-
ceptably high risks of abuse.118 There are good reasons to think that elec-
tronic self-help would create such risks. As Part I discussed, section 2B-
310 would authorize intrusion at the licensor’s sole discretion; in this, it
resembles the “confession of judgment” clauses that Scott condemns as
offering too great a temptation “to evade contractual risks.”119 Once again,
this concern is especially great for self-help unconnected to payment, and
intended solely to regulate unacceptable behavior as defined by the licen-
sor. In addition, Scott notes that distributional concerns might justify some
regulation of otherwise efficient creditor self-help practices.120 To the ex-
tent that copyright’s user privileges reflect such concerns, as this article
                                                                                                                        
114. See Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive Creditor Remedies, 89
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115. See id. at 744-49.
116. Id. at 750-51.
117. Id. at 763-64.
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119. Id. at 765; see supra text accompanying notes 21-24.
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argues they do, they might well justify a ban on licensor self-help that
takes the form of direct electronic control of user behavior.121
A different sort of justification for creditor self-help remedies is sup-
plied by theories that marry consent and efficiency rationales for commer-
cial rules. Starting from essentially libertarian premises, Randy Barnett
argues that rules about contract enforcement must be premised on individ-
ual consent.122 To avoid the pitfalls of subjectivism, however, Barnett
contends that consent should be presumed when legal rules mirror social
conventions.123 Barnett’s “conventionalist” analysis resonates with the
norm-based approach to commercial law, which emphasizes the interplay
between law and extra-legal social ordering among groups. To these theo-
rists, the “new law merchant” should reflect a decentralized, bottom-up
approach to lawmaking that seeks to affirm existing commercial prac-
tices.124
An initial problem that confronts the use of norm theory to justify
electronic self-help is that such self-help is not, as a factual matter, the or-
dinary practice—yet. Whether it becomes the norm will depend, in part,
on how the law chooses to treat it; norms and law constitute each other in
important and complex ways.125 More fundamentally, however, the notion
that commercial law should be premised on market norms is deeply prob-
lematic when applied to the consumer mass market. Norms presuppose
communities, and analysis of contracting behavior in the consumer mass
market suggests that the community that drives the evolution of mass
market norms is the community of providers. Norms also presuppose a
sense of shared benefit, and community satisfaction is not necessarily the
most appropriate measure for rules that affect relationships between com-
munity members and outsiders.126 Certainly, such norms cannot be said to
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123. See id. at 855-59, 875-97.
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be freely chosen by the outsiders whom they affect.127 In addition, they
may be inefficient when assessed in terms of their effect on the larger so-
ciety within which the community exists.128 The fact of the larger commu-
nity also should cause us to question our initial identification of provider
practice as the relevant norm; if, instead, we chose the community of con-
sumers as the baseline, we probably would discover that existing social
norms militate in favor of copyright user privileges.129
Historical evidence suggests that Karl Llewellyn, who first conceived
the Uniform Commercial Code, sought to establish the Article 2’s mer-
chant-nonmerchant distinction precisely so that the rules governing mer-
chants could be regularized without placing individual consumers at a dis-
advantage or constraining courts’ equitable powers in merchant-consumer
disputes involving sales of goods.130 For similar reasons, Article 9 con-
tains provisions that afford heightened protection for individual consumers
in the context of secured transactions.131 Arguably, Article 2B’s distinc-
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Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEO. L.J. 1141 (1985); Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The
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37
tion between negotiated and mass market licenses is more appropriate for
information markets; many small businesses that Llewellyn might con-
sider “merchants” are nonetheless consumers of mass marketed informa-
tion products.132 However, Article 2B turns Llewellyn’s point on its head
by according less protection to mass market licensees than to parties to
negotiated agreements, and the least protection to individuals who use li-
censed information products for personal, non-business purposes.133 This
approach is consistent with the hypothesis that Article 2B reflects provider
norms. That information providers as a group feel Article 2B would put
them at an advantage in their dealings with consumers hardly constitutes a
compelling case for its adoption.134
Still needed, then, is a standard by which to evaluate the desirability of
the particular self-help regime embodied in Article 2B. Economic analysis
of commercial law posits that the law of commercial transactions should
focus primarily on establishing default rules that are “efficient.” For some
legal scholars, this means that legal rules for resolving disputes should re-
flect the ex ante bargains that a majority of the parties would have
reached.135 Others contend that the law should sometimes set default rules
differently, to encourage one or both parties to reveal information in the
course of bargaining around them.136 Once again, however, the notion that
a rule should mirror or encourage “bargaining” is less than useful in the
mass market context, where bargaining typically does not occur on a term-
by-term basis. In the mass market, consumers are contract takers; they can
refuse to buy, or hold out for a lower price, but they generally cannot de-
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mand a particular package of contract terms or product characteristics.137
Thus, if the default rule under Article 2B allows electronic regulation and
self-help, we would not expect to see consumers bargain around that rule
in most cases—even if the rule were structured as a “penalty default” re-
quiring actual disclosure to consumers.138 The opposite rule, disallowing
electronic self-help unless authorized in a separately-negotiated agree-
ment, probably would encourage more “bargaining,” in that information
providers most likely would offer lower prices to consumers willing to
agree to electronic monitoring. But information providers also might offer
non-monitored products at such high prices that most consumers could not
or would not purchase them.139 Thus, under either rule, electronic regula-
tion might become the prevailing approach without consumers having any
real say in the matter. The problem here is not lack of “bargaining” per se,
or even lack of knowledge, but rather lack of consent and inability to af-
fect the options on the table.140 One may say many things about the results
of such a system—that they reduce transaction costs, or that they promote
                                                                                                                        
137. See, e.g., DANIEL W. BROMLEY, ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND INSTITUTIONS: THE
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 65-66 (1989); Samuel Bowles & Herbert
Gintis, The Political Economy of Contested Exchange, in RETHINKING POWER 196, 221
(Thomas Wartenburg ed., 1992); Cohen, supra note 7, at 362-70.
138. See O’Rourke, supra note 102, at 83-87 (suggesting this approach for contract
terms that alter the copyright balance). Ayres and Gertner term this a “penalty default” ap-
proach because it penalizes the more informed party (here, the licensor) for failure to dis-
close information by applying a default rule that is undesirable from that party’s perspec-
tive. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 135, at 97-98. This is the model chosen, for example,
for U.C.C. § 2-316, which requires express disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchant-
ability. As noted above, a number of states and the federal government have concluded that
the penalty default model for § 2-316 provides inadequate consumer protection. See supra
note 52.
139. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449-50 (7th Cir. 1996) (outlining a
similar strategy); O’Rourke, supra note 102, at 62-63 (discussing the efficiencies available
to information providers as a result of price discrimination). Since most consumers in the
real world operate under budget constraints, this would not necessarily mean that consum-
ers did not value the absence of electronic monitoring and self-help.
140. It is for this reason that leading scholars have for decades described this regime as
one of “private legislation.” See Goldberg, supra note 105, at 468 n.15, 484-91; Friedrich
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM.
L. REV. 629 (1943); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1984); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Demo-
cratic Control of Law-Making Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 538-42 (1971); Vukowich,
supra note 105, at 800-11; cf. Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property and the Costs of
Commercial Exchange: A Review Essay, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1570, 1611-13 (1995) (offering
a narrower definition based on antitrust-style market power). For a more detailed discussion
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freedom of contract for information providers—but one cannot say that
they are reliable measure of what consumers want.
Another way to approach the question of private ordering of rights in
creative and informational works is by asking whether such private order-
ing creates unacceptable costs, either for consumers or for society gener-
ally. If so, we might decide that a prohibition on the use of electronic
regulation and self-help—or on their use in certain categories of dis-
putes—should be an immutable rule.141 The answer to the question de-
pends largely on how overall or social welfare is defined. From a purely
allocative standpoint, the mass market behavior predicted above suggests
that banning electronic private ordering would be inefficient. If most con-
sumers would submit to self-help that negates their copyright privileges,
that would mean that they do not value these privileges as highly as licen-
sors value their absence. Allocative efficiency is a poor measure of social
welfare, however. Social welfare is in part a function of nonmonetizable
values, external effects, and distributional concerns, all of which the allo-
cative criterion ignores.142 To decide whether the law should permit or
forbid contractual exit from copyright, we must consider the particular so-
cial goals that copyright is intended to promote, and whether market trans-
actions in private-law “usage rights” will promote them as effectively.
As I have demonstrated elsewhere, the copyright system promotes the
social goals of creative progress and public access to creative works in
important ways that the market cannot measure.143 Because it is difficult to
assess creative potential ex ante, because there is no necessary relationship
between creative potential and ability to pay, and because current infor-
mation providers may perceive some works by second-comers (for exam-
ple, parodies) as detrimental to their interests, there is no reason to think
that giving information providers control over all uses of their information
products would result in more or better creative progress.144 Even under a
well-functioning regime of contractual usage rights, moreover, second-
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about the appropriate regime of rights in creative and informational works).
144. See id. at 335-44; see also Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in
Intellecutual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1048-68 (1997).
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comers whose works produce substantial shared social benefits would be
unable to appropriate the full value of their contributions, and would be
unwilling to pay the prices demanded by existing content owners.145 In
this respect, the enhanced accessibility of creative and informational
works under copyright law produces important external benefits that most
likely would be underproduced by a private-law, market-based regime.146
Copyright’s access and use privileges, which distribute the “costs” of un-
compensated uses broadly among all consumers, attempt to correct for this
market failure—or, more accurately, for this failure of markets.147
In short, the copyright regime of limited rights and user privileges not
only serves nonmonetizable and distributional concerns, but those con-
cerns also are central to a particular understanding of creative and social
“progress.” This suggests that overall or social efficiency may well require
an immutable rule prohibiting electronic regulation and self-help in at least
some circumstances where private ordering threatens to disrupt the copy-
right balance. At the very least, the case for unfettered electronic private
ordering is resoundingly inconclusive.
V. THE U.C.C., COPYRIGHT, AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE
DISTINCTION
We turn now from Article 2B’s doctrinal and theoretical antecedents to
the question of its validity as a matter of federal copyright law and policy.
Whether the self-help provisions of Article 2B implicate copyright law, or
the limits imposed on copyright law by the First Amendment, turns on in-
terpretation of the public-private distinction in the particular context of the
laws that govern ownership of creative and informational works. For Arti-
cle 2B’s electronic rights management and self-help provisions to be valid,
Article 2B must be seen to establish merely a neutral background or
framework for private exchange. Indeed Article 2B is intended to establish
a background framework; however, the framework is not neutral. To the
                                                                                                                        
145. See Cohen, supra note 7, at 384-87; see also Lemley, supra note 144, at 1056-58.
146. See Cohen, supra note 7, at 384-90. User privileges that increase the accessibility
of creative and informational works also contribute to the creation of a shared basis for so-
cial discourse and the development of a rich and robust public sphere independent from
government contol. See id. at 384-87, 394-98; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a
Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 347-64 (1996); cf. C. Edwin Baker, Giving
the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311, 350-66 (1997) (describing shared exter-
nal benefits and costs produced by mass media products). These shared social benefits also
must be included in any assessment of the total value generated by creative and informa-
tional works.
147. See Cohen, supra note 7, at 387-90.
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extent that Article 2B is intended to give information providers the tools
and the authority to contract around their limited entitlements under copy-
right law and into more robust entitlements of their own design, its adop-
tion threatens to subvert completely the statutory and constitutional under-
pinnings of federal intellectual property law. Moreover, the process that
produced Article 2B has been dominated by information provider interests
to such a degree that the public-private distinction cannot credibly be in-
voked to shield their conduct.
A. Preemption and the “Dormant Intellectual Property Clause”
The public-private distinction mediates the relationship between copy-
right and contract in several different ways. First, as discussed in Part II, it
helps to define the scope of preemption under section 301 of the Copyright
Act. Section 301 preempts state-created rights in the subject matter of
copyright that are “equivalent” to the rights afforded by copyright.148 It is
fairly clear that Congress did not intend section 301 to preempt many pri-
vate contracts relating to works falling within the subject matter of copy-
right—for example, agreements authorizing book publication and distri-
bution, or authorizing the public display of copyrighted films.149 That does
not end the matter, however. Some “contracts” closely resemble univer-
sally-applicable proprietary rights. In particular, standard-form, mass mar-
ket “licenses” for creative and informational works elide the boundary
between property and contract.150 Any state that adopts the electronic
regulation and self-help provisions of Article 2B should recognize that it is
authorizing the implementation of quasi-proprietary regimes that will af-
fect thousands and even millions of consumers.
Even if contracts as a class are outside the scope of section 301,
though, the electronic regulation and self-help provisions of Article 2B fall
afoul of the general principle, embodied in the Supremacy Clause, that a
                                                                                                                        
148. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994); see supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
149. See Rice, supra note 17, at 602-04.
150. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 7, at 322-28; Cohen, Some Reflections, supra note 17,
at 181-82; Elkin-Koren, supra note 17, at 107-10; Dennis S. Karjala, Federal Preemption of
Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 511, 528-33 (1997); Robert P.
Merges, Intellectual Property and the Costs of Commercial Exchange: A Review Essay, 93
MICH. L. REV. 1570, 1611-13 (1995); see also Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law,
and Sui Generis Protection of Databases in the United States and Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L.
REV. 151, 166-70 (1997) (agreeing that the rights created by mass market contracts ap-
proach property rights, but suggesting that copyright policy supports allowing such con-
tracts in the case of uncopyrightable databases).
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state-created regulatory regime cannot undermine federal law.151 Here, the
federal law in question is both statutory and constitutional.
The Supreme Court has issued conflicting pronouncements as to
whether it will find implied preemption when the federal statute in ques-
tion contains an express preemption provision that does not cover the
challenged action.152 Most recently, however, it has suggested that a nar-
row preemption provision merely establishes a rebuttable presumption of
Congress’ intent not to preempt.153 The conflict between Article 2B and
the Copyright Act presents a strong case for finding such a presumption
rebutted. It is clear that when Congress enacted section 301 as part of the
Copyright Act of 1976, it did not consider the possibility of state legisla-
tion designed to enable self-enforcing digital contracts that would enable
the wholesale displacement of copyright.154 And, as discussed above,
authorizing information providers to define the scope of their entitlements
would materially undermine the social objectives that the Copyright Act is
intended to promote. The Court’s preemption decisions establish as much.
Although the Court has held that states may grant protection to potentially
copyrightable works that Congress has not chosen to protect,155 it has also
held that they may not grant property-like rights in unprotectable inven-
tions, although they may afford a lesser level of protection.156 On the same
                                                                                                                        
151. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Gade v. National Solid Waste Management Ass’n,
505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988).
152. Compare Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288 (1995) (“The fact that
an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a statute ‘implies’ … that Congress did not
intend to pre-empt other matters does not mean that the express clause entirely forecloses
any possibility of implied pre-emption.”), with Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S.
504, 517 (1992) (“When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has included
in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and when that provi-
sion provides a ‘reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority,’ …
‘there is no need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive
provisions’ of the legislation.”) (citations omitted).
153. See Myrick, 514 U.S. at 288.
154. Indeed, Congress’ codification of the first sale doctrine, under which the initial
sale of an object embodying a copyrighted work exhausts the copyright owner’s right to
control the further disposition of that object, suggests just the opposite. See 17 U.S.C. §
109(a) (1994).
155. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 560 (1973).
156. Compare Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (allowing
enforcement of a contract requiring ongoing royalty payments for the right to use a trade
secret that had subsequently fallen into the public domain, but noting that the two-party
agreement did not prevent others from copying the technology) and Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1974) (allowing state law protection of trade secrets,
but noting that the protection afforded by trade secrecy laws is substantially less complete),
with Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (striking down
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reasoning, nor may they confer property-like rights in unprotectable (as
opposed to merely unprotected) works, or in unprotectable aspects or
components of otherwise copyrightable works.
Ultimately, however, the determination of conflict is not Congress’ to
make. Neither the copyright objectives nor the limitations on copyright
ownership designed to promote them are legislatively-determined. Both
are required by the language of the Intellectual Property Clause of the
Constitution, which authorizes Congress to grant “exclusive Right[s]”
only to “Authors and Inventors” for “their respective Writings and Dis-
coveries,” and only for “limited Times.”157 To qualify as a patentable in-
vention under this standard, an innovation must represent a nonobvious
advance over the prior art; to qualify as a copyrightable “writing,” an ex-
pression must attain a minimal level of originality.158 Consistent with
these requirements, the Intellectual Property Clause prohibits copyright
protection for facts, ideas, methods of operation, and other elements of
“writings” that do not in themselves constitute original expression.159
Congress, of course, has other sources of power. In particular, it may
use its commerce power to grant certain types of rights in intellectual
creations; the Lanham Act is one such example.160 However, the com-
                                                                                                                        
state statute that prohibited a commonly-used method of reverse engineering unpatented
boat hulls), Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964) (holding that
states may not use their unfair competition laws to confer perpetual protection on functional
but unpatentable product features), and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S.
234, 237 (1964) (same). See generally Howard B. Abrams, Copyright, Misappropriation,
and Preemption: Constitutional and Statutory Limits of State Law Protection, 1983 SUP.
CT. REV. 509.
157. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
158. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (holding that Intellectual
Property Clause prohibits Congress from “enlarg[ing] the patent monopoly without regard
to the innovation, advancement, or social benefit gained thereby,” and from “issu[ing] pat-
ents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict
free access to materials already available”); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) (holding that Intellectual Property Clause requires originality
as a prerequisite for copyright, and therefore bars protection for facts and ideas).
159. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-50 (holding denial of copyright protection for facts
constitutionally compelled); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103-104 (1879) (holding meth-
ods of operation protectable, if at all, only under the patent system, and indicating that the
Intellectual Property Clause informs this result); The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-94
(1879) (holding that Intellectual Property Clause does not authorize grant of exclusive
rights in trademarks).
160. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1058,
1125 (1994) (authorizing federal registration of and/or protection for trademarks, trade
dress, and other designators of product origin used in connection with goods or services in
interstate commerce).
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merce power is plenary only up to a point; it may not be exercised in a
manner that ignores other, more specific constitutional constraints.161
Thus, Congress may not invoke the commerce power to do what the In-
tellectual Property Clause bars it from doing: granting “exclusive
Right[s]” in unpatentable or uncopyrightable subject matter.162 Nor may it
invoke the commerce power to authorize the states to grant such rights.163
Congress, in short, could neither enact nor authorize the provisions of Ar-
ticle 2B that allow information providers to grant themselves exclusive
rights in uncopyrightable content, and to extend their exclusive rights in
copyrightable expression for unlimited times.
Where Article 2B is concerned, the relevant question is how these
limits on Congress’ power bear on what the states may do on their own.
Here the plot thickens, for the Court has held that the Intellectual Property
Clause does not bar states from enacting their own forms of intellectual
property protection, even for works otherwise patentable or copy-
rightable.164 But it has never held that the states may offer protection that
conflicts with the constitutional scheme, and indeed, on the terms of its
own preemption decisions, it could not. The statutory limits that required
preemption in those cases are positive constitutional mandates as well.
The Intellectual Property Clause denies protection to certain subject matter
precisely so that it may remain in the public domain, available to all com-
ers.165 It follows that where unpatentable know-how and uncopyrightable
                                                                                                                        
161. See, e.g., Railway Labor Executives Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468-69
(1982) (holding that Congress may not invoke the commerce power to enact bankruptcy
legislation that violates the Bankruptcy Clause’s uniformity requirement).
162. See Marci A. Hamilton, The Dormant Copyright Clause, 66-70 (1998) (draft un-
published manuscript, on file with author); David L. Lange, The Intellectual Property
Clause in Contemporary Trademark Law: An Appreciation of Two Recent Essays and Some
Thoughts About Why We Ought to Care, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 213, 225-44 (Spring
1996); Malla Pollack, Unconstitutional Incontestability? The Intersection of the Intellectual
Property and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution: Beyond a Critique of Shakespeare Co.
v. Silstar Corp., 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 259, 313-20 (1995).
163. Thus, the rule of Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946), does not
apply here. See id. at 419-27 (holding that commerce power encompasses congressional
authorization for states to discriminate against interstate commerce).
164. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 560 (1973); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 482-83 (1974) (citing Goldstein). For criticism of the Goldstein deci-
sion, see Abrams, supra note 156, at 527-30.
165. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991)
(reasoning that the constitutionally-granted copyright power requires that facts, ideas, and
the like remain in the public domain as building blocks for subsequent creators to use);
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (reasoning that constitutionally-granted
patent power requires that insufficiently innovative advances remain in the public domain,
because of the high social cost of monopoly when weighed against “the inherent free nature
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facts or principles are concerned, the same restrictions that bind Congress
also bind the states.166 Any state adopting Article 2B should recognize that
it effectively allows information providers to opt out of those restrictions,
thereby frustrating constitutional policy.
B. Speech Harms and the First Amendment
The public-private distinction also demarcates the boundary between
private disputes about infringement and public regulation of speech. This
observation is commonplace as to tort law. Private parties may sue for
defamation, but the state may not structure its law of defamation to chill
speech on matters of public concern.167 Because copyright also implicates
First Amendment concerns, the same analysis applies. Private parties may
sue for infringement, but neither Congress nor the courts may define the
law of infringement in a way that tramples on speech. In particular, the
Court has indicated that the idea-expression distinction and the fair use
doctrine—and the public domain that these limitations on copyright own-
                                                                                                                        
of disclosed ideas”); Abrams, supra note 156, at 579; Lange, supra note 162, at 225-44;
David Lange, Copyright and the Constitution in the Age of Intellectual Property, 1 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 119, 130-34 (1993); L. Ray Patterson, Copyright Overextended: A Pre-
liminary Inquiry into the Need for a Federal Statute of Unfair Competition, 22 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 385, 394-95 (1992); cf. Pollack, supra note 162, at 313-20.
166. In allowing states to afford their own forms of protection for potentially protect-
able works, the Court noted that states may have special interests in particular innovations,
and that the framers granted intellectual property powers to Congress because they believed
that a state-by-state patchwork of protection would be ineffective. See Goldstein, 412 U.S.
at 556-58. Abrams, in particular, has raised serious objections to this reasoning. See
Abrams, supra note 156, at 527-30. Even taken at face value, however, it does not justify
allowing state-level protection that applies (via choice-of-law clauses) extraterritorially, and
is so effective that it frustrates the federal scheme. Cf. Paul J. Heald, Comment, Unfair
Competition and Federal Law: Constitutional Restraints on the Scope of State Law, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1411 (1987) (arguing that federal trademark and unfair competition law
should preempt extraterritorial application of state unfair competition law via multistate
injunctions). Just as the states have not reserved the power to frustrate Congress’ commerce
authority, they also have not reserved the power to frustrate its intellectual property author-
ity, but only the right to adopt limited forms of protection that supplement federal incen-
tives to innovate.
167. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1964) (holding that
Alabama libel law violated First and Fourteenth Amendments as applied to critics of a pub-
lic official’s conduct); Cohen, supra note 9, at 1020-21; cf. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,
501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991) (holding that enforcement of promissory estoppel claim consti-
tuted state action).
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ership guarantee—are necessary adjuncts of a statute that creates proprie-
tary rights in expression.168
Even if the Intellectual Property Clause did not constrain Congress’
power to grant “exclusive [r]ights” in intellectual creations, Congress
could not erase these First Amendment-based limitations on copyright’s
reach. Similarly, even if no “dormant Intellectual Property Clause” binds
the states, no state could establish a regime of proprietary rights in infor-
mation that ignored First Amendment boundaries. Sections 2B-310 and
2B-715, in contrast, appear to stand for the proposition that private infor-
mation providers may use non-negotiated, digital standard forms to en-
force prohibitions on a broad range of speech activity, ranging from the
traditional (criticism, educational discussion, and commentary on the news
of the day) to the less so (reverse engineering of software).169 Any state
adopting Article 2B should recognize that widespread adoption of these
practices would significantly undermine the First Amendment’s guaran-
tees.170
C. Private Enforcement and Due Process
Finally, the public-private distinction determines what procedures may
be used to enforce contract rights. The Supreme Court’s procedural due
process decisions make clear that a state-aided seizure of licensed infor-
mation products, as authorized under section 2B-715 of Article 2B, would
require certain pre-deprivation safeguards.171 Yet in Flagg Brothers, Inc.
                                                                                                                        
168. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555-60
(1985); Lange, supra note 162, at 239-40; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
510 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1994).
169. Cf. Bernstein v. United States Dep’t of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1429 (N.D. Cal.
1996) (holding that computer source code is speech protected by the First Amendment).
170. As a facially content-neutral law that burdens speech, Article 2B would need to
undergo “heightened” or “intermediate” scrutiny. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 114 U.S.
2445, 2469 (1994); see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518
U.S. 727, 740-53 (1996) (applying Turner scrutiny to content-based legislation allowing
private cable operators to prohibit “patently offensive” programming on leased channels).
For an idea of how the analysis might go, see Cohen, supra note 9, at 1024-28. Briefly, it is
difficult to imagine a government interest “substantial” enough to justify wholesale con-
tractual displacement of core First Amendment rights of comment and criticism, and easy to
imagine ways in which Article 2B might be tailored to prevent that result.
171. See Connecticut v. Doehr, 509 U.S. 1 (1991); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant & Co., 416
U.S. 600, 615-20 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972); see also Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339-49 (1976) (setting forth a three-part balancing test for deter-
mining the level of procedural protection to be afforded prior to a state-ordered deprivation
of property). The exact amount of “process” that should be required before a court-ordered
seizure of information products is a matter for debate. Doehr suggests that due process re-
quires a hearing when the facts alleged to support the seizure are not readily susceptible of
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v. Brooks,172 the Court held that a private warehouse that had been storing
the plaintiff’s household goods was not required to provide a hearing be-
fore selling the goods to satisfy her account, even though a provision of
the U.C.C. adopted by the state authorized the sale. Private self-help re-
possession, in short, does not involve “state action” and thus is subject to
fewer procedural constraints than enforcement via judicial process.
As Flagg Brothers suggests, the argument that Article 2B merely will
establish neutral background rules for private exchange comports with a
well-established (though much-criticized) understanding of the public-
private distinction.173 However, sections 2B-310 and 2B-715 do far more
than simply reshape the private law of contract to accommodate the
unique characteristics of information products. Any state adopting Article
2B should recognize that the proprietary regimes Article 2B authorizes
likely will rely heavily on electronic self-enforcement, and even more
heavily on electronic “regulation of performance” ex ante. As a result, the
definition of “informational rights”—which, until now, has occurred
largely via the judicial enforcement process—will be insulated from pub-
lic oversight. Article 2B does not merely provide default rules for the pri-
vate sector; rather, it works a radical reconceptualization of what “private”
encompasses.
D. Private Interests and Public Acts
Finally, it is worth noting that Article 2B in fact constitutes a hybrid
species of action, both public and private, that the conventional under-
standing of the public-private distinction does not contemplate. Article 2B
is (or will be, if enacted) public action at the behest—and, some would
argue, the direction—of particular private interests.174 Public-choice
                                                                                                                        
documentary proof. See Doehr, 509 U.S. at 13-15. This is likely to be the case when fair
use is claimed, since the challenged use must be considered in light of the totality of the
circumstances. Doehr also suggests that exigent circumstances might justify granting a sei-
zure based only on an ex parte judicial hearing, and affording the debtor a post-deprivation
hearing. See id. at 16-18. As discussed above, intangible collateral generally does not raise
the same exigency concerns as physical, rivalrous collateral. See supra notes 107-10 and
accompanying text. Finally, the Doehr Court did not reach the question whether the Due
Process Clause requires that the party seeking the seizure post a bond. See id. at 18. But see
id. at 18-21 (plurality) (arguing that a bond is constitutionally required).
172. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
173. See, e.g., Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg
Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296 (1982).
174. The capture of the Article 2B drafting process has been alleged by numerous ob-
servers. See, e.g., Gail Hillebrand, The Uniform Commercial Code Drafting Process: Will
Articles 2, 2B and 9 Be Fair to Consumers?, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 69 (1997) (arguing that the
U.C.C. drafting process systematically disadvantages consumer interests); Kaner, supra
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analysis of Article 2B is complicated by the involvement of the National
Council of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law
Institute in the U.C.C. drafting and approval process. However, pioneering
efforts to model the decision-making patterns of “private legislatures”
such as the NCCUSL and the ALI suggest that their involvement makes
the U.C.C. process more, not less, subject to capture.175
Systematic exploration of whether and how the phenomenon of legis-
lative capture should affect judicial characterization of state laws modify-
ing traditionally private-law regimes is well beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. Nonetheless, one of the primary rationales for the public-private dis-
tinction—that laws governing private transactions merely establish a neu-
tral, background framework for private bargaining—is significantly weak-
ened when public power is coopted to serve a private agenda. The result-
ing law is neither “neutral” nor “background;” it is a partisan instrument
undertaken to serve a specific purpose. The realist-inspired challenge to
the conventional understanding of the public-private distinction holds that
the state always chooses.176 One need not accept that conclusion to see
that when the state enters a private dispute as captive or agent of an af-
fected interest, rather than as “neutral” arbiter, there is a much stronger
argument that it should bear responsibility for the result.
The question that Article 2B poses is this: May the states reshape their
law of contract to allow automatic, self-enforcing foreclosure of conduct
                                                                                                                        
note 19 (describing information providers’ role in the Article 2B drafting process); Con-
sumer Project on Technology, Protest Page on: Uniform Commercial Code Article 2B
(visited Nov. 7, 1998) <http://www.cptech.org/ucc/ucc.html>.
175. See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform
State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (1996); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political
Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995); Robert E. Scott, The
Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783 (1994).
It is perhaps unsurprising that initial efforts to integrate the insights of public choice
theory and the legal understanding of the public-private distinction have been in the area of
antitrust. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Antitrust Immunity: State Action and
Federalism, Petitioning and the First Amendment, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 293
(1994); John S. Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV.
713, (1986). Under the antitrust laws, the NCCUSL probably would be considered analo-
gous to a private standard-setting organization, with the result that the state-action immu-
nity doctrine would not shield from judicial scrutiny efforts to coopt the standard-setting
process. See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988);
Lemley & McGowan, supra note 175, at 308-13.
176. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 173; Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Pub-
lic/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423 (1982); Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of
the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982).
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privileged by copyright law and, ultimately, by the Intellectual Property
Clause and First Amendment, given that they may not reshape their tort
law or their trade secrecy law to produce a similar result? I have suggested
that the answer must be no. Whatever the force of arguments that private
enforcement of private contracts does not constitute state action, the same
arguments cannot apply to state legislation designed largely to authorize
private information providers to opt out of the framework of proprietary
rights and exceptions established by federal copyright law and mandated
(in broad brush) by the Constitution. Put differently, the states should not
be able to set default rules that invite information providers to override
exceptions that lie at the core of the federal copyright balance.177 By con-
ferring on information providers the authority to displace federal copyright
law, sections 2B-310 and 2B-715 of Article 2B constitute a deliberate
usurpation of Congress’ role in defining and enforcing the scope of pro-
tection in creative and informational works. By any standard—and cer-
tainly if the limitations on copyright ownership are to continue to have any
meaning in the market for digital works—this is a public act that the In-
tellectual Property Clause and the First Amendment should not permit.
Part VI contends, instead, that copyright law and policy require quite a
different approach to electronic self-help in information markets.
VI. RESTORING THE BALANCE: THE CASE FOR LICENSEE
SELF-HELP
Courts may, and should, apply principles of preemption and freedom
of speech to invalidate license terms authorized by Article 2B that are in-
consistent with copyright limitations.178 Because of the self-enforcing na-
ture of digital rights management technologies, however, relying exclu-
sively on these principles to cure Article 2B’s excesses would be unwise.
The restrictions authorized by sections 2B-310 and 2B-715 are intended to
operate automatically, and in many cases without advance disclosure.179
These provisions shift the burden of initiating litigation to the licensee,
                                                                                                                        
177. See Cohen, supra note 9, at 1022-23; cf. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 162 n.12 (“This
is not to say that dispute resolution between creditors and debtors involves a category of
human affairs that is never subject to constitutional constraints.”). This is doubly so for
mass market information providers, whose boilerplate “agreements” operate as quasi-
legislative regimes. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 151-173 and accompanying text. Ordinarily, these will be mass
market license terms, for the reasons suggested supra notes 111-126 and accompanying
text; however, I do not intend to suggest that terms in negotiated licenses may never be
subject to preemption.
179. See supra Part II.
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who in many cases will be poorly equipped to bear it. It is not clear,
moreover, what copyright-based cause of action a licensee could assert.180
Restoring the copyright balance requires procedural as well as substantive
measures. Specifically, it requires that rights of self-help be extended to
licensees.181
Of course, Article 2B does not leave information consumers wholly
without recourse to challenge information providers’ electronic regulation
and self-help practices. Electronic regulation of performance “that pre-
vents use permitted by the agreement” constitutes a breach, as does elec-
tronic self-help repossession in violation of the restrictions imposed by
section 2B-715.182 If a consumer wishes to file suit, Article 2B provides
the usual assortment of contract remedies.183 In addition, in any case in-
                                                                                                                        
180. Fair use, the idea-expression distinction, and preemption traditionally have been
raised (and conceived) as defenses to claims of infringement. See, e.g., 4 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §§ 13.03[B][2]-[4], 13.05, p. 13-149
(46th rel. 1998).
181. The simplest and best way to restore the balance that copyright law was designed
to establish would be to set better ground rules—including some immutable rules, see supra
text accompanying note 141—for digitally-mediated transactions in creative and informa-
tional works. The Article 2B drafting committee could acknowledge the implications of
electronic private ordering of “informational rights” and exercise its power more responsi-
bly. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual
Property Rights: The Limits of Article 2B of the U.C.C. 26-45 (Apr. 10, 1998) (draft un-
published manuscript, on file with author) (advocating the inclusion of a “public interest
unconscionability” provision to protect “the public interest in education, science, research,
technological development and the preservation of competition”); see also U.C.C. § 2B-
105(b) & Reporter’s Note 3 (July 24-31, 1998 Draft) (noting the introduction and adoption
of a similar motion at the NCCUSL’s July 1998 Annual Meeting, but implementing the
public policy limitation in substantially watered-down form). Instead, the drafters have
elected an empty and disingenuous formalism that pleads lack of jurisdiction to address the
preemption issue even as it assiduously undermines federal interests. See U.C.C. § 2B-105,
Reporter’s Note 3 (July 24-31, 1998 Draft); id. at 10-12. Alternatively, Congress could im-
pose limits on techno-contractual displacement of copyright. See, e.g., Digital Era Copy-
right Enhancement Act, H.R. 3048, 105th Cong. (1997) (rendering unenforceable “non-
negotiable license terms” that abrogate fundamental copyright policy, as expressed in
statutory limitations on copyright protection). Thus far, however, Congress has failed to do
so; instead, it too has deferred substantially to private ordering, electing not to confront the
conflict brewing between digital standard forms and traditional (and constitutionally-
mandated) copyright principles. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-
304, § 3, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998); infra note 200. Even if Congress were to act to restore the
balance, however, the new rules still would need to be interpreted and enforced. Thus, the
procedural considerations discussed in the text would remain vitally important.
182. U.C.C. § 2B-310(d) (July 24-31, 1998 Draft); see id. § 2B-715.
183. See U.C.C. §§ 2B-706 (July 24-31, 1998 Draft) (fraud), 2B-709 (damages), 2B-
711 (specific performance), 2B-713 (right to continue use), 2B-714 (right to discontinue
use); see also id. §§ 2B-208(b) (right to refund if mass market license terms are unaccept-
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volving electronic self-help repossession, section 2B-715 affords the li-
censee the right to an expedited post-seizure hearing.184
Nonetheless, Article 2B is not a consumer protection statute, and
plainly, the drafters do not intend it to be one. Edward Rubin has criticized
the U.C.C. for establishing remedial processes that systematically disad-
vantage consumers.185 Rubin decries the U.C.C.’s use of a common-law
institutional model for enforcement of consumer remedies as inappropriate
given the expense and complexity of litigation, and given the incentives
created for merchants, as repeat players in the litigation process, to litigate
disputes aggressively for strategic reasons.186 In a similar vein, Jean
Braucher suggests that the uncertainty that surrounds judicial application
of the “breach of the peace” standard and the minimal damages typically
awarded to successful debtor plaintiffs deter lawyers from agreeing to rep-
resent debtors in wrongful repossession suits.187 Both Rubin and Braucher
argue that effective consumer protection requires inexpensive, accessible
procedures and incentive-shifting remedies such as statutory damages and
attorneys’ fees.188
One avenue of recourse for consumers of mass marketed information
products might be the Federal Trade Commission, which has broad juris-
diction over “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com-
merce.”189 Licenses for information products, which implicate federal
                                                                                                                        
able), 2B-616 (same right extended to licensees who acquire information products from a
distributor). Article 2B also provides, however, that the license agreement may limit the
available remedies “to return of, or delivery to the other party [of] all copies of the informa-
tion and refund of the contract fee.” Id. § 2B-703(a).
184. See U.C.C. § 2B-715 (July 24-31, 1998 Draft).
185. See Edward L. Rubin, The Code, the Consumer, and the Institutional Structure of
the Common Law, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 11 (1997); see also Braucher, supra note 51, at 557-
60.
186. See Rubin, supra note 185, at 21-42.
187. See Braucher, supra note 51, at 557-60.
188. See Rubin, supra note 185, at 58-60 (recommending public enforcement of con-
sumer claims); id. at 33 (“For the last twenty years, federal legislation involving commer-
cial relationships between merchants and consumers has routinely provided for attorney’s
fee and court cost awards to prevailing consumer plaintiffs.”); id. at 41 (“A statutorily liqui-
dated amount, or a mechanical rule by which damages can be calculated without proving
actual loss, will lower litigation costs significantly in cases of this nature.”); Braucher, su-
pra note 51, at 559 (advocating statutory “specificity concerning what acts are prohibited”
and “a remedy that provides a prize worth the trouble and expense of pursuing a lawsuit”);
id. at 613-14 (recommending conversion damages as a “minimum statutory penalty” for
wrongful repossession that would not be offset against the debt still owing).
189. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1994). See generally EDWIN S. ROCKEFELLER, DESK BOOK
OF FTC PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 53-58 (3d ed. 1979) (delineating sources of and limits
on FTC jurisdiction).
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copyright interests as well as interstate commerce, fall squarely within the
class of transactions with which the FTC is properly concerned. Thus, for
example, we might expect the FTC to take an interest in Article 2B’s pro-
visions and information providers’ practices relating to disclosure and dis-
claimer of warranties—and, if necessary, to request that Congress extend
the specific protections afforded under the federal Magnuson-Moss War-
ranty Act to information products.190 In the case of electronic self-help, we
would expect the FTC to take an interest in licensor practices relating to
disclosure of terms, and to care whether consumers are given adequate
notice of the possibility of electronic self-help and the conduct that will
trigger it.191
The FTC, however, has neither the jurisdiction nor the expertise to
preserve the substantive balance mandated by federal copyright law. Here,
Rubin’s analysis hints at another option for consumers. Rubin suggests
that the law might partially “correct[] the imbalance” inherent in the civil
litigation process by allowing consumers to use certain self-help remedies,
thereby shifting to merchants the burden of initiating litigation.192 His
analysis applies with even more force to Article 2B, because the addition
of self-enforcing technological restraints to information providers’ arsenal
of enforcement measures produces an even greater imbalance.
In the case of sections 2B-310 and 2B-715, the greater worry is not
that information providers will breach their “contracts” with licensees, but
that they will honor them, thereby stripping licensees of the privileges they
enjoy, and have come to expect, under the public law of copyright. Jane
Ginsburg has suggested that in some circumstances the law might afford
licensees who engage in contractually-prohibited conduct that is permitted
by copyright a “right of fair breach.”193 That is fine as far as it goes, but an
abstract right of breach may count for little in the face of self-enforcing
technological protection. I propose to extend Ginsburg’s suggestion even
                                                                                                                        
190. Currently, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act covers only warranties relating to
“tangible personal property.” 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1) (1994). The Act and its associated FTC
regulations establish requirements for the contents of warranties, including clear and com-
prehensible disclosure of terms and procedures for asserting claims, and mandate minimum
substantive standards for warranty protection. See id. §§ 2301-10; 16 C.F.R. §§ 700 et seq.
191. See supra Part III.B (discussing notice and overbreadth issues).
192. Rubin, supra note 185, at 54.
193. Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Without Walls: Speculations on Literary Property in
the Library of the Future, 42 REPRESENTATIONS 53, 63-64 (1993). Ginsburg appears to
believe, however, that these occasions should be rare. See id. at 63-65.
It is worth noting that patent licensees have similar rights. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395
U.S. 653, 676 (1969) (invalidating contract terms purporting to estop licensee from chal-
lenging patent validity).
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further: If the user privileges established by copyright, and necessary to
ensure that proprietary rights in expression do not frustrate First Amend-
ment freedoms, are to mean anything, users must be afforded affirmative
rights to protect themselves. A “right of fair breach” is meaningless unless
it includes a right to effectuate the breach—a right to hack the digital code
that implements and enforces the challenged restriction.
Larry Lessig has characterized digital code as “privatized law”—“law
that need not fit with, or respect, public law,” but instead may undermine
values that public law has attempted to protect.194 With respect to rights
management code, at least, this is both true and false. Code constitutes it-
self as an inexorable arbiter of permissible conduct.195 In this, as Lessig
observes, it is not really “contract” at all; rights denominated “contract”
are themselves subject to public policy limits.196 Yet rights management
code is, at the same time, simply the physical instantiation of desired con-
tract restrictions.197 If information providers may not contract around
copyright- and First Amendment-based limits on information ownership, it
follows they also may not invoke code as an independent legal basis for
avoiding those limits.198 To the extent that copyright overrides inconsistent
contract provisions, it supplies a defense for licensees who disable the
protective code in order to commit electronic breach. The corollary to Les-
                                                                                                                        
194. Electronic mail from Larry Lessig, Professor, Harvard Law School, to recipients
of list CO-E-CONF (Nov. 8, 1996) (on file with author) (proceedings of 25-person online
focus group convened by the United States Copyright Office, as part of its “Project Looking
Forward,” to discuss the future course of Internet technology and its implications for copy-
right); see also Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach
(Sept. 20, 1998 Draft) <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/works/lessig/LNC_Q_D2.PDF>; Law-
rence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403 (1996).
195. See Lessig, Zones, supra note 194, at 1408 (“One obeys these laws as code not
because one should; one obeys these laws as code because one can do nothing else …. In
the well implemented system, there is no civil disobedience.”).
196. See Lessig, The Law of the Horse, supra note 194, at 25-27.
197. Indeed, section 2B-310 says as much. See U.C.C. § 2B-310(b)(2) & Reporter’s
Note 2 (July 24-31, 1998 Draft) (“This Section distinguishes between active and passive
electronic devices …. [A] passive device merely precludes acts that constitute a breach.”).
198. Even if the federal courts were to conclude that Article 2B does not conflict with
federal copyright law, for that matter, consumers would still have other legitimate First
Amendment and privacy-based grounds for objecting to some of its more intrusive reme-
dies. For discussion of these grounds, see Cohen supra note 9. It appears that Congress
agrees with this analysis. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 3,
112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (enacting new section 1201 of the Copyright Act, but specifying in
section 1201(i) that individuals may tamper with rights management systems to prevent the
collection of personally-identifying information).
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sig’s observation, in short, is that public law need not respect inconsistent
code.199
Licensees who hack, of course, face the prospect that they will be sued
and their actions judged infringing.200 But this is the ordinary rule; the
right to challenge a rule of law by violating it is sacred, but the individual
disobeys the law at his or her peril. In the case of digital rights manage-
ment systems, recognizing a right of self-help for licensees simply reaf-
firms the balance between authors and users, and between information
ownership and the public domain—a balance that Article 2B threatens to
distort beyond recognition.201
VII. CONCLUSION
The electronic rights management provisions of Article 2B represent
bad policy, bad theory, and bad law. Allowing electronic intrusion into
private homes and offices, and into private computer systems maintained
there, would grossly violate established principles of privacy; would em-
power private information providers to decide a dangerously broad range
of factual and legal disputes; and would enable complete displacement of
the copyright framework of limited entitlements and user privileges. There
is no tenable theoretical justification for according information providers
                                                                                                                        
199. This argument was first set forth in an online discussion group convened by the
United States Copyright Office in November 1996. See Electronic mail from Professor Julie
Cohen, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, to recipients of list CO-E-CONF (Nov. 8,
1996) (on file with author). I am indebted to Larry Lessig for naming it the “Cohen Theo-
rem.” Electronic mail from Professor Lawrence Lessig, Harvard Law School, to recipients
of list CO-E-CONF (Nov. 11, 1996) (on file with author); Lawrence Lessig, Tyranny in the
Infrastructure, WIRED, May 1997, at 96.
200. I would be remiss not to note that there will soon be additional risks. Congress re-
cently enacted legislation prohibiting this particular form of civil disobedience. See Digital
Millenium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, §3, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). The anti-
tampering provisions are subject to a two-year moratorium while the Librarian of Congress
assesses their impact on fair use, and to ongoing oversight thereafter. See id. Efforts to
amend the bill to make fair use an outright defense to a charge of tampering with or cir-
cumventing digital rights management systems were unsuccessful. The analysis in this arti-
cle suggests, however, that such a defense may be constitutionally mandated. See supra Part
V.A-B.
201. It is true that most individuals lack the skills needed to hack rights management
code. If such hacking is lawful, though, skilled individuals will be able to sell their services
to others. Cf. Cohen, supra note 9, at 1029-30 (arguing that individuals who hack rights
management code to preserve constitutionally-protected rights of anonymity will have
standing to assert their customers’ rights). If the consequences of this “universal private
ordering” are unacceptable, other avenues for preserving the copyright balance remain
available. See supra note 181.
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such sweeping authority. To the contrary, copyright’s user privileges are
constitutionally mandated. A state law that seeks to enable information
providers to opt out, en masse, from the copyright system cannot, and
should not, be saved by ritual invocation of the public-private distinction.
For the same reasons, the technologies that implement this exit cannot,
and should not, be protected against private acts of resistance designed to
preserve the copyright balance.
